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ARTICLES
Litigation's Regulatory Pathways and the
Administrative State: Lessons from U.S. and
Australian Climate Change Governance
HARI M. OSOFSKY & JACQUELINE PEEL*
ABSTRACT

The administrative state struggles to address massive, complex problems such
as ameliorating the financial crisis, preventing terrorism, or responding to climate
change. These problems cut across levels of government-local, state, national,
international-and substantive areas of law. Yet our governance structures, for
the most part, are not designed to deal well with issues that involve multiple types
of governance authority and institutions. A burgeoning literature by leading U.S.
scholars describes this problem and proposes solutions. These analyses often
include some case law, but their primary focus has been on the legislative and
executive branches in the United States. This article argues that, even accepting
the constraints of constitutional separation of powers and of administrative law in
this country, a fuller exploration of the regulatory role of courts is needed.
Drawing from the comparative experiences of the United States and Australia in
responding to climate change, it provides a novel model for understanding the
direct and indirect regulatory pathways that litigation provides in common law
* Hari M. Osofsky is a Professor, University of Minnesota Law School; 2013-14 Fesler-Lampert Chair in
Urban and Regional Affairs; Director, Joint Degree Program in Law, Science & Technology; Faculty Member,
Conservation Biology Graduate Program; Adjunct Professor, Department of Geography, Environment and
Society; and Fellow, Institute on the Environment. Jacqueline Peel is a Professor at the University of Melbourne
School of Law and a 2012-2013 Visiting Scholar at University of California, Berkeley; Associate Director of
the Centre for Resources, Energy, and Environmental Law at Melbourne Law School. This article has benefitted
greatly from feedback and discussion at a Workshop on Climate Change Litigation, Policy and Mobilization
held at the British Academy and at faculty presentations at the University of Minnesota Law School and the
University of Melbourne School of Law. We would like to thank Lee Godden, Kristin Hickman, J.B. Ruhl, and
Gerry Simpson for their thoughtful commentary on the draft. We also appreciate the excellent research
assistance of Lisa Caripis, Emma Cocks, Joseph Dammel, and Drew McNeill, and the thoughtful editorial
assistance of Georgetown InternationalEnvironmental Law Review Executive Editor, Kate Wright; Managing
Editor Stephen Thomasch; and Senior Editors Michael Clore and Matthew Wilson. Hari Osofsky would also
like, as always, to thank Joshua, Oz, and Scarlet Gitelson for their love, support, and patience and Jacqueline
Peel acknowledges, with gratitude, the love and support of Michael, Aly, and Will Findlay. @ 2013, Hari M.
Osofsky and Jacqueline Peel.
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jurisdictions. This model and its application help to illuminate the nexus between
litigation and regulation, which allows for a more complete understanding of
governance in the context of complex problems.
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INTRODUCTION

The administrative state struggles to regulate massive, complex problems
adequately. Unfortunately, even a brief glance at a daily newspaper reveals their
pervasiveness. From the ongoing problems with power outages to the repercussions of the financial crisis and government shutdown to debates over climate
change, our society teems with urgent issues that our regulatory framework is ill
equipped to face. These problems cut across levels of government-local, state,
national, international-and substantive areas of law. Yet our governance structures, for the most part, are not designed to deal well with issues that require
responses from multiple types of governance authority and institutions.
A burgeoning literature among leading U.S. scholars attempts to model how
progress might be made. For example, Richard Lazarus describes climate change
as a "super-wicked" problem-one that is not only enormously complicated, but
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that also poses problems of timing, incentives, and massive scope.' He considers
how governance institutions should be designed to tackle this challenge. J.B.
Ruhl and Jim Salzman have provided a model for "whittling away" at massive
problems that cannot be solved by individual agencies. 2 Jim Rossi and Jody
Freeman have explored how agencies could coordinate more effectively in the
shared regulatory space created when issues intersect the domains of multiple
regulatory agencies. This scholarship makes an innovative and important
contribution to conceptualizing how the structure of governance and institutions
impacts regulatory effectiveness.
These analyses of how to address complex problems, however, primarily focus
on the legislative and executive branches within the United States. Although they
reference case law, they only minimally engage the role that the judicial branch
can, and does, play in helping to create and develop administrative responses to
complex problems.4 This emerging scholarship on complex problem solving also
largely refrains from considering how the United States experience compares to
that of other common law countries.5

1. Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the
Future, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1153 (2009). Lazarus explains that "Scholars long ago characterized a public-policy
problem with the kinds of features presented by climate change as a "wicked problem" that defies resolution
because of the enormous interdependencies, uncertainties, circularities, and conflicting stakeholders implicated
by any effort to develop a solution." Id. at 1159.
2. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative
State: A Guidefor Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REV. 59 (2010).
3. Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131
(2012).
4. Although an extensive scholarly literature exists on the nexus between litigation and regulation, see, e.g.,
ANDREW P. MORRISS, BRUCE YANDLE, AND ANDREW DORCHAK, REGULATION BY LmGATION (2009); Patrick Luff,

Risk Regulation and Regulatory Litigation, 64 RUTGERs L. REv. 73 (2011); Jules Lobel, Courts as Forums for
Protest, 52 UCLA L. REV. 477 (2004), it remains largely separate from the emerging scholarship on how to
address complex regulatory problems in the administrative state. Part of this separation may result from the fact
that this scholarship on complex problems is largely situated in the broader context of administrative law. In the
United States, the Administrative Procedure Act structures this area of the law, supplemented by the "generally
held view in the United States that federal courts should not make common law but should act only when they
are statutorily authorised to act." Jack M. Beerman, Common Law and Statute Law in US Administrative Law, in
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING STATE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF MARK ARONSON 45 (Linda Pearson et al, eds.,

2008). Australian administrative law takes a similar approach. This article does not contest the focus on the
executive and legislative branches within the predominant administrative law framework in common law
countries. As the Beerman quote reinforces, the judicial branch plays an interpretive role and separation of
powers serves as an important constraint on the regulatory role of court. Numerous judicial doctrines, such as
political question-through which courts decline to decide an issue because it is a political one within the
purview of the legislative and executive branches-restrain the courts from trampling on political or executive
authority. This article argues, however, that, even accepting constitutional and administrative law constraints on
the judicial role, a fuller exploration of the regulatory role of courts in the context of complex problems is
needed.
5. While a rich and long comparative law tradition exists in administrative law, that scholarship remains
mostly separate from the emerging literature on complex problems. For examples of the comparative
administrative law literature, see ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING STATE, supra note 4; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND GOVERNANCE IN ASIA: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Tom Ginsburg and Albert H.Y Chen, eds. 2009); FRANK
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This article fills these gaps. Drawing from the comparative experiences of the
United States and Australia in responding to climate change, the article provides
a novel model for understanding the regulatory pathways that litigation provides
in common law jurisdictions. It uses climate change as a case example for
exploring linkages between litigation and regulation because it is a particularly
complex problem that has been the subject of extensive litigation in both
countries. Even within the constraints of constitutional separation of powers and
administrative law, these lawsuits directly and indirectly influence when and how
this complex problem is addressed, and, in the process, perform a regulatory
function in the administrative state. The article maps these multiple pathways for
influence and applies them to the regulatory and litigation experiences of the two
jurisdictions.
In so doing, this article makes important contributions to the literature in
administrative law on regulating complex problems, the interdisciplinary scholarship seeking to understand the explosion of litigation over climate change, and
the work in comparative law on both countries. The article bridges these areas of
scholarship through its innovative model for understanding the regulatory impact
of climate change litigation. As a growing number of lawsuits over climate
change have been filed in courts around the world in the past fifteen years-two
of which resulted in high profile U.S. Supreme Court judgments-a "first wave"
of scholarship has chronicled individual cases or developments in particular
jurisdictions and a "second wave" has sought to systematize the case law by
looking for patterns or trends and developing typologies to understand and
categorize disparate actions. This article provides a critical next step in a "third
wave" of scholarship on this litigation's regulatory role through its framing and
exploration of the regulatory pathways that litigation has taken, is taking, and
likely will take in the United States and Australia.6 More broadly, the article's

J. GOODNow, AN ANALYSIS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS, NATIONAL AND LOCAL, OF THE UNITED STATES,

ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND GERMANY (1893); Francesca Bignami, From Expert Administration to Accountability
Network: ANew Paradigmfor ComparativeAdministrative Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 859 (2011). This pattern of
separation is not unique to U.S. scholars writing in this area. For example, in Australia, a group of scholars
collaborating in the "Regulatory Institutions Network" have developed an extensive theory of how institutions
could be more responsive to formal and informal dynamics and have created a regulatory pyramid to facilitate
that structuring. This network's occasional papers series generally focuses on Australia, with only one recent
piece applying the model in cross-jurisdictional institutional contexts with relatively limited focus on how the
jurisdictions themselves compare. For a discussion of this theory generally, see Valerie Braithwaite, Ten Things
You Need to Know About Regulation and Never Wanted to Ask, RegNet Occasional Paper No. 10 (2006),
availableat http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/occasionalpapers.htm. For the comparative law application, see
Charlotte Wood, Mary Ivec, Jenny Job & Valerie Braithwaite, Applications ofResponsive Regulatory Theory in
Australia and Overseas,RegNet Occasional Paper No. 15 (2010), availableat http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/
occasionalpapers.htm.
6. For further discussion of these waves, see infra notes 41-48 and accompanying text. We recognize that it
may be premature at this still early stage in the development of this litigation to conceive of climate change
litigation research as having any form of "tradition" that could be characterized in this way. We think that this
concept of waves has value, though, in differentiating the nature of our work from what has gone before while
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approach helps to illuminate the nexus between litigation and regulation, which
allows for a more complete understanding of governance in the context of these
challenging but important problems.
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I situates the discussion of climate
change litigation as a form of regulation by defining it and considering its role in
the emerging multi-dimensional system of climate change governance. It also
examines how climate change litigation serves as more than simply a gap filler in
the absence of robust national and international regulatory frameworks, and the
concomitant need for greater research attention to be directed to the question of
the regulatory impact of climate change litigation. Part II of the article turns to the
specific regulatory contexts of the United States and Australia, sketching the state
of government-led climate change regulation in each country in order to contextualize our discussion of the role that litigation plays. In addition, we explore the
reasons why the climate change litigation experiences of the United States and
Australia offer a rich basis for comparative analysis and for drawing broader
lessons about the ways climate change litigation can and might influence
regulatory pathways, with a consideration of the role of the common law tradition
in creating those possibilities. Finally, Part III of the article proposes a model for
litigation's pathways of regulatory influence, both direct and indirect,7 and
applies that model to the examples of United States' and Australian climate
change litigation. This application illustrates how the model can serve as a tool
for understanding the judicial branch's regulatory role in addressing complex
governance challenges.

I.

CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION AND GOVERNANCE

Climate change litigation, in a range of forms, and brought in a multitude of
fora,8 has captured the attention of the public and policy-makers, and is the
subject of a rapidly developing body of academic literature. 9 Climate change
litigation has been particularly prominent and extensive in the United States and
Australia-both common law jurisdictions with significant coal industries--due
in part to the slow pace of development of climate change regulation in these
countries, and at the international level in negotiations for future requirements for

acknowledging the important contribution made by previous research to developing our understanding of
climate change litigation. These waves represent conceptual rather than chronological development; some third
wave scholarship, including articles by the co-authors, was published several years ago, and some first and
second wave scholarship continues to be produced. However, thinking of these types of scholarship as a
progression helps to clarify how they fit together.
7. Jolene Lin, Climate Change andthe Courts, LEGAL STUD., no. 32, 2012 at 35-57.
8. Brian J. Preston, Climate Change Litigation (Part1), 1 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REv. 3 (2011); Brian J.
Preston, Climate Change Litigation (Part2), 2 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REv. 244 (2011).
9. See, e.g., ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, & INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, (William
C.G. Bums & Hari M. Osofsky eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2009); CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND PRACICE (Richard Lord et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2012); infra section I.B.
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greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction. Even with the progress made at the
2011 and 2012 climate change negotiations in Durban and Doha on a schedule for
a universal agreement in effect from 2020, paired with acceptance of a second
commitment period by some Kyoto parties,o a significant gap remains between
what international treaties may achieve and the emissions reductions scientists
stress are urgently needed in order to give the planet a reasonable chance of
avoiding warming of greater than two degrees Celsius. In the lead-up to 2020,
therefore, the role of national and sub-national regulation of climate change is
likely to be critical, making pertinent the question of the part that climate change
litigation plays in shaping regulatory pathways.
Climate change litigation is a phenomenon that extends beyond the United
States and Australia. However, the volume and impact of the litigation in these
two countries make a comparative examination of their contribution particularly
important. They provide case examples for evaluating the extent to which climate
change litigation can constructively impact regulatory pathways and, as a
consequence, make a difference in addressing this complex problem. Understanding the ways in which litigation serves as regulation, mandates regulation, and
fosters regulation-as well as its limits-helps to provide a more complete view
of how litigation has, is, and could help to produce more effective approaches to
mitigation and adaptation. Both successful cases and "ostensibly unsuccessful"
cases, brought at times by those who want to strengthen regulation and at times
by those who want to challenge or weaken it, can transform or tweak the
regulatory landscape." Moreover, these examples have implications beyond the
climate change context; they illuminate broader possibilities for the role of the
judicial branch in solving complex problems faced by the administrative state.
This part considers the unique governance challenges that climate change
poses and the role that climate change litigation can play and is playing in that
regulatory context. It begins by presenting climate change as a multi-dimensional
regulatory problem and considering the ways in which it cuts across levels of
governance and areas of law. It then examines how the particular characteristics
of litigation allow it to serve not only as a means of enforcement, but also as a
generative source of regulation well-suited to the complexity of the problem.

10. The second commitment period will run from 2013-2020. See Outcome of the Ad Hoc Working Group
on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol, 8 December 2012, Draft Decision CMP.8, FCCCIKP/CMP/2012/L.9, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/cmp8/eng/109.pdf. The
commitment to take on further emissions reductions under the auspices of the Kyoto Protocol came primarily
from the European Union and Australia. Japan and Russia insisted prior to Durban that they would not agree to a
second commitment period. Canada has formally withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol and the United States is,
of course, not a party. Australia has accepted a second commitment period with an emissions reduction target of
five percent below 2000 levels, retaining an option to increase its target to fifteen or twenty-five percent subject
to certain conditions being met while the universal agreement is still being negotiated.
11. Preston, Climate Change Litigation (Part1), supra note 8; Preston, Climate Change Litigation (Part2),
supra note 8.
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Before turning to this analysis, though, it is important to consider the
fundamental definitional question of what constitutes "climate change litigation."
This issue is difficult to resolve because of the cross-cutting nature of the
problem; disputes over climate change span a wide range of substantive areas of
law and judicial and quasi-judicial fora. While most commentators would agree
that lawsuits in courts with climate change as their central focus are climate
change litigation, the outer boundaries are harder to establish. We choose in this
article to take a relatively broad view of where these boundaries lie. Our
definition of climate change litigation includes cases which take place in
quasi-judicial contexts and which reference climate change amid a panoply of
issues. However, we focus largely on cases at the core as exemplars in order to
illuminate the regulatory role of litigation interacting most directly with efforts
by the administrative state to address the climate change problem.
Interrelated with this narrower definitional question about climate change
litigation are broader questions regarding the nature of regulation and its
relationship to governance. Although these broad questions are not this article's
primary focus, our analysis throughout is grounded in a socio-legal tradition that
treats a wide range of formal and informal action by diverse actors as regulatory
and as part of an overall governance process. This tradition takes a variety of
forms across the relevant scholarly literature-such as legal pluralism,12 polycentric governance,'" new governance,' 4 and regulatory institutions theory," just to

12. Global legal pluralism treats multiple normative, and sometimes legal, communities as operating in
shared social space and considers the implications of having simultaneous valid orders. For examples of this
scholarship, see Robert B. Ahdieh, DialecticalRegulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863 (2006); Diane Marie Amann,
Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2085 (2005); Diane Marie Amann, Calling Children to Account: The Proposal
for a Juvenile Chamber in the Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, 29 PEPP. L. REv. 167 (2001); Elena A. Baylis,
ParallelCourts in Post-Conflict Kosovo, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2007); Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal
Pluralism,80 S. CAL. L. REv. 1155 (2007); William W. Burke-White, InternationalLegal Pluralism,25 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 963 (2004); Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to InternationalLawmaking: The Tale of
Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 125 (2005); Ralf Michaels, The Re-State-Ment of
Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law, and the Challengefrom Global Legal Pluralism,51 WAYNE L. REV.
1209 (2005). Hari Osofsky has explored a legal pluralist view of climate change litigation in Hari M. Osofsky,
Climate Change Litigation as PluralistLegal Dialogue?,26 STANFORD ENvTL. L.J. & 43 STANFORD J. INT'L L.
181 (2007). Similarly, the New Haven School views law as "a process of authoritative decision by which the
members of a community clarify and secure their common interests." I HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S.
McDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIEr STUDIES IN LAw, SCIENCE AND POLICY xxi (1992); accord
Myres S. McDougal, W. Michael Reisman & Andrew R. Willard, The World Community: A PlanetarySocial
Process,21 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 807 (1988). For a discussion of the New Haven School's goals, see LASSWELL &
McDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR AFREE SOCIETY, supra at xxix.
13. For a discussion of polycentric governance, see infra note 29 and accompanying text.
14. For examples of new governance scholarship, see LAW AND NEw GOVERNANCE INTHE EU AND US
(Grilinne de Btirca & Joanne Scott eds., Hart Publ'g 2006); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Reply, "New Governance "
in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to OverzealousLumping, 89 MINN. L. REv. 471,
471-75 (2004); Orly Lobel, Surreply, Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, 89 MINN. L. REv. 498,
498 (2004); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall ofRegulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary
Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342 (2004). J.B. Ruhl and James Salzman's article on addressing complex
problems effectively in the administrative state draws from new governance theory. Ruhl & Salzman, Climate
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name a few-and we examine how this tradition helps to frame our model in
section I.A.16
A.

CLIMATE CHANGE AS A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL REGULATORY PROBLEM

Because climate change involves emissions and impacts in multiple countries,
nation-states have attempted to solve this problem through a multilateral treaty
regime, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), and additional agreements negotiated under it. Following a framework-protocol model, the UNFCCC provides general commitments and a framework for annual negotiations on more specific targets and timetables. 17 The 2011
Conference of the Parties (COP) in Durban resulted in an agreement to launch a
negotiating process with the aim of reaching a universal agreement by 2015
through an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced
Action.' 8 In addition, at the 2012 Doha COP, thirty-seven of the Parties to the
Kyoto Protocol"-the only agreement negotiated under the UNFCCC which
provides binding targets and timetables-agreed to extend the Protocol to a
second commitment period running from 2013-2020.20
However, the international treaty regime faces two foundational limitations as
the primary regulatory approach to climate change, both of which help to create
litigation's regulatory role. First, the existing regime and negotiations are failing
to achieve their goal of mitigating emissions adequately. 21 The Kyoto Protocol's
first period commitments were too limited, were not met by all Parties, and did
not include the United States.2 2 Many Kyoto Protocol Parties, including key

Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problemsin the Administrative State, supra note 2, at 97-98, 102-08.
15. For a discussion of the Regulatory Institutions Network, see supra note 7.
16. See infra Part III.A.
17. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
18. Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, 15 Mar.,
2012, Decision 1/CP. 17, FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, availableat http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/copl7/eng/

09a01.pdf.
19. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37
I.L.M. 22 (1998).
20. Outcome of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto
Protocol, 8 December 2012, Draft Decision -/CMP.8, FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/L.9, available at http://unfccc.intl
resource/docs/2012/cmp8/eng/109.pdf.
21. Kelly Levin & Rob Bradley, ComparabilityofAnnex I Emission Reduction Pledges 21 (World Resources
Institute Working Paper), available at http://pdf.wri.org/working-papers/comparabilityof~annexl_emission_

reduction-pledges.2010-02-01.pdf; UNITED NATIONs ENv'T PROGRAMME, REPORT 2012: A UNEP SYNTHEsis
REPORT (2012), available at http://www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/emissionsgap2012/; Hari M. Osofsky,
Suburban Climate Change Efforts: Possibilitiesfor Small and Nimble Cities Participatingin State, Regional,
National, and InternationalNetworks, CORNELL J.L. & PuB. Po'Y (forthcoming 2012).
22. LEGAL ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL MECHANISMS: MAKING KYOTO WORK (David
Freestone & Charlotte Streck eds., 2005); RUSSIA AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

(Anna Korppoo et al. eds., 2006); Alastair R. Lucas, Mythology, Fantasy and Federalism: CanadianClimate
ChangePolicy and Law, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEv. L.J. 41, 52-56 (2007).
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emitters like Canada, Japan, and Russia, are not making second period commitments.2 3 The universal agreement, even if negotiations are successful, is still
many years away.24 The current failures create a regulatory gap that climate
change litigation attempts to address.
Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, climate change is a problem that
interacts with many levels of government and types of law and involves a wide
range of public and private actors. The complex regulatory dynamics at each
level involve: (1) scientific, technical, and legal uncertainty; (2) simultaneously
overlapping and fragmented legal regimes; (3) difficulties of balancing inclusion
and efficiency; and (4) inequality and resulting injustice. 25 Even a more effective
treaty regime would struggle to capture the ways in which both mitigation and
adaptation interact with the individual, local, state, national, and interstitial
regional scales. Hari Osofsky has drawn from numerous streams of international
legal theory and geographic network theory to analyze pathways for exploring
less nation-state-centric approaches to climate change regulation.26 In a parallel
stream of scholarship, Elinor Ostrom, and scholars building upon her work, have
presented a similar model for "polycentric" climate change governance, which
examines the ways in which this myriad of key actors at different levels might
form part of an overall regulatory approach.
Most relevant to this article's project, these models all provide possibilities for
valuing the role of litigation in climate change regulation. If a vision of climate
change governance views treaties among nation-states as only one piece of a
regulatory puzzle, even if the most important one, that opens an inquiry into how
other approaches to regulation fit into an overall scheme. The next section
focuses in particular on litigation as one such complementary approach.

23. Outcome of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto
Protocol, supra note 20.
24. Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, supra note 18.
25. Hari M. Osofsky, Litigation'sRole in the Path of U.S. FederalClimate Change Regulation: Implications
of AEP v. Connecticut, 46 VALPARAISO U. L. REv. 447 (2012) (describing these dynamics in the context of the
Supreme Court's decision in AEP v. Connecticut); Hari M. Osofsky, AEP v. Connecticut's Implicationsfor the
Future of Climate ChangeLitigation, YALE L.J. ONLINE (2011) (same).
26. Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation: Implications for Transnational
Regulatory Governance, 83 WASH. U. L. REV. 1789, 1789-1855 (2005); Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation as
PluralistLegal Dialogue?,supra note 12, at 181-237; Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change "International"?:
Litigation's Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 VA. J. INT'L L. 585, 585-650 (2009); Hari M. Osofsky, The
Geography of Climate Change Litigation PartII: Narratives of Massachusetts v. EPA, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 573,
573-620 (2008); Hari M. Osofsky, The Continuing Importance of Climate Change Litigation, I CLIMATE L. 3
(2010); Hari M. Osofsky, DiagonalFederalism and Climate Change: Implicationsfor the Obama Administration, 62 ALA. L. REv. 237, 237-303 (2011); Hari M. Osofsky, Suburban Climate ChangeEfforts, supra note 21.
27. Daniel H. Cole, From Global to Polycentric Climate Governance, (EUI Working Paper No. 2011/30,
2011), available at http://www.eui.eu/Projects/GGP/Documents/Publications/WorkingPapers/RSCAS201130DanHCole.pdf; Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change (World Bank
Research Working Paper No. 5095, 2009).
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B. LITIGATION AS AREGULATORY APPROACH
Litigation is primarily treated in common law countries as a forum for
enforcement and interpretation of the law, rather than as a site of potential
regulatory development. However, both the United States and Australia also have
traditions of activists using lawsuits to try to influence the shape of law and
regulation in addition to assisting their clients in a particular case. 28 Most
relevant to this article's focus on the administrative state, governmental and
nongovernmental actors seeking greater or less regulation often use lawsuits to
clarify an agency's regulatory authority under a statute, to change how an agency
exercises that authority, or to enforce that authority. 29
Jacqueline Peel has argued in the climate change context that litigation has
often been used in a strategic fashion as a response to inadequate law-making
activity by government and to prompt wider policy change.o In Australia, for
example, a leaked Greenpeace campaign document revealed plans for the
extensive use of legal challenges to coal-mining projects as part of a wider
strategy of "Stopping the Australian coal export boom."3 Similar campaigns
operate in the United. States targeting coal-fired power stations and seeking to
"quit coal" in favor of "clean energy" sources.3 2 While litigation is by no means
the only mechanism available for social mobilization and activism on climate
change, litigation is unique in being able to take advantage of the apparatus of
the state (that is, courts as the third branch of government) to achieve regulatory
change. As the Australian Greenpeace campaign document outlines:
Legal challenges can stop projects outright, or can delay them in order to buy
time to build a much stronger movement and powerful public campaigns. They

28. This strategy, which takes many forms, is at times referred to in the United States as "impact litigation."
For a discussion of different impact litigation strategies, arguing for the value of large numbers of small claims
in addition to class action approaches, see Andrew D. Freeman & Juli E. Farris, GrassrootsImpact Litigation:
Mass Filing of Small Claims, 26 U.S.F. L. REv. 261 (1992).
29. This section focuses on the literature exploring the regulatory role of climate change litigation. For
examples of the broader literature on litigation and regulation, see sources cited supra note 4.
30. Jacqueline Peel, The Role of Climate Change Litigation in Australia'sResponse to Global Warming, 24
ENvTL. & PLAN. L.J. 90,90-105 (2007).
31. JOHN HEPBURN ET AL., GREENPEACE AusTL., STOPPING THE AUSTRALIAN COAL ExPoRr BOOM: FUNDING
PROPOSAL FOR THE AUSTRALIAN ANTI-COAL MOVEMENT (2011). A copy of the leaked report is available at
http://www.abc.net.aulmediawatch/transcripts/1206__greenpeace.pdf. Coal mining companies reacted with veiled
threats to have any such claims struck out as an abuse of process entailing substantial costs orders for
unsuccessful claimants.
32. See Quit Coal, http://quitcoal.org/ (last visited June 14, 2012). Other sites, such as Coalswarm.org,
provide information resources for community-based campaigns. There is also a Quit Coal organization in the
Australian state of Victoria, http://quitcoal.org.aul (last visited August 5, 2012).
33. MARK DIESENDORF, CLIMATE AcTION: A CAMPAIGN MANUAL FOR GREENHOUSE SOLUTIONs (Univ. of NSW
Press 2009).
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can also expose the impacts, increase costs, raise investor uncertainty, and
create a powerful platform for public campaigning. 34

Navraj Ghaleigh describes climate change litigation of this kind as "promotive,"
where often "applicants are seeking to deploy more general legal norms which
have no necessary climate-change characteristics in ways that can promote
positive environmental outcomes by way of regulatory intervention sanctioned or
even required by courts.""3 In reaction to "promotive" climate change litigation,
regulation resulting from it, and regulatory initiatives by state and local government, a body of "anti-regulatory" climate lawsuits has developed, particularly in
the United States.3 6
Characteristic of both "promotive" and "anti-regulatory" climate litigation is
the involvement of many diverse actors, including sub-national governments,
not-for-profit environmental groups, corporations, business organizations, community groups, and individuals. Climate change litigation cases thus often
function as a forum for diverse actors to engage in a dialogue about the
appropriateness of particular regulation. The disagreements often have scalar
dimensions, with anti-regulatory parties arguing that climate change is too big a
problem for regulation at a particular level and pro-regulatory parties demonstrating state and local impacts.3
Moreover, the issues that courts are asked to address in climate change cases,
although framed in the context of specific legal requirements and factual settings,
often reflect common themes.3 These include questions around: what amounts to
a significant or meaningful contribution to global climate change (a single large
coal mine? if so, how large?); what level and type of evidence is necessary to
establish such a contribution; and whether impacts should be assessed cumulatively (in light of all other contributing sources) and holistically (taking account
of all emissions associated with the activity-for example, these might be
emissions from burning coal at offshore locations for a coal mine). The rulings
issued by courts in climate change cases, across various jurisdictions and at
different levels of governance (sub-national, national, and international) can thus
be seen to play an important role in articulating forms of "transnational climate
change regulation." 39
Viewing litigation as an appropriate site for regulatory development to address

34. JOHN HEPBURN ET AL., supra note 31, at 6.

35. Navraj Ghaleigh, "Six honest serving men": Climate change litigation as legal mobilization and the
utility oftypologies, CLIMATE LAW, no. 1, 2010 at 45.
36. David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New
Jurisprudenceor Business as Usual, 64 FLA. L. REv. 15, 15-86 (2012).
37. Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change "International"?,supra note 26, at 585-650.
38. Jacqueline Peel, Issues in Climate ChangeLitigation, I CARBON & CLIMATE L. REv. 15 (2011).
39. Hari M. Osofsky, The ContinuingImportance of Climate Change Litigation, CLMATE L., supra note 26,
at 3-29.
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climate change is not uncontroversial. Various criticisms have been advanced, for
instance, that courts lack the necessary expertise to determine questions of
climate change regulation, that policy decisions should be left to elected politicians, and that, ultimately, climate change litigation will be ineffective as a
mechanism for the mitigation of climate change given hurdles posed by technical
legal rules around standing, costs, and justiciability (or political doctrine)
questions. These factors certainly may act as restraints on the capacity of
litigation to contribute to climate change regulation and require serious attention
in any project concerned with climate change litigation's broader regulatory
impact.4 0 However, it is important not to neglect the potential for the evolving
case law itself to generate innovation, especially in the interpretation and
application of technical legal rules, which may help to overcome some of the
existing barriers faced by claimants.
A more pervasive concern, articulated by a number of the critics of climate
change litigation, is that the focus of regulatory efforts should be on developing
national and international laws to address climate change in a top-down,
coordinated fashion. They argue that bottom-up modes for generating legal
change run the risk of being piecemeal, uncoordinated and even contradictory.4 1
As highlighted in the parts that follow, this criticism, in our view, simultaneously
overestimates the appetite for concluding far-reaching, timely climate change
measures at the national and international levels, and underestimates the complex, multi-dimensional character of climate change regulation. Hence, in the
current political environment, while climate change litigation may not provide
the whole answer to the problem of climate change, it is increasingly clear that it
will be an important part of the answer.
As this view has gained prominence, there has been a corresponding shift in
the nature of research and scholarship on climate change litigation. In what we

40. Hari M. Osofsky, The Intersection of Science, Scale, and Law in Massachusetts v. EPA, 9 OR. REV. INT'L
L. 233, 233-60 (2007). Hence, while these questions fall outside the scope of the current article they will be
treated in detail in the broader book project being undertaken by the authors.
41. See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, A Realistic Evaluation of Climate Change Litigation through the Lens of a
Hypothetical Lawsuit, 79 U. COLo. L. REv. 701, 704 (2008) (arguing that "[t]he somewhat tenuous bases for
liability in this hypothetical lawsuit tell us a number of things about climate change litigation: (1) that for all the
discussion of climate change litigation, the reality is that under current laws, liability is likely to be imposed, if
at all, only in a fairly narrow set of circumstances; (2) that although courts have often filled in gaps left by
legislative inaction, their ability to adapt to the evidentiary issues posed by global climate change law is limited;
and (3) that, in the end, litigation can probably only play a modest role in bringing about reductions in
greenhouse gases, and that broad-based legislative and international action must be the primary means of
addressing the problem of global climate change."); Laurence H. Tribe et al., Too Hot for Courts to Handle:
Fuel Temperatures, Global Warming, and the Political Question Doctrine,at 12 (Wash. Legal Found., Critical
Legal Issues Working Paper Series no. 169, 2010) (arguing as part of their claim that the political question
doctrine should have barred climate change nuisance cases that "global climate change raises such manifestly
insuperable obstacles to principled judicial management that its very identification as a judicially redressable
source of injury cries out for the response that the plaintiffs have taken their "petition for redress of grievances"
to the wrong institution altogether.").
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have dubbed the "first wave" of such scholarship, the focus was generally on
particular, high-profile cases, or the emerging case law in a particular jurisdiction.42 Case law in the United States and Australia has often been a focus here
given the U.S. Supreme Court's influential climate law rulings in Massachusetts
v. EPA4 3 and American Electric Power v. Connecticut," and, in both countries,
their relatively long (in climate law terms) history of climate change cases going
back to the earliest decisions in 1994 in Australia 45 and 1998 in the United
States.4 6 As climate change case law began to accumulate and accelerate during
2009-2010, and also as such litigation took on a more global profile with the
emergence of cases in other jurisdictions, a "second wave" of scholarship

emerged. Here the goal, as in Ghaleigh's seminal piece, has been to try to make
sense of the diversity of cases brought in different jurisdictions, under a range of
different legal theories and legal regimes, by creating typologies for understanding the function of or motivation for these cases.47
This more holistic view of climate change litigation has provided an important
foundation for a "third wave" of scholarship concerned with the regulatory
impact of such litigation to which both co-authors have been leading contributors.48 Key issues in this latter area of research include the following: (1) how has
climate litigation shaped the behavior of important actors in the climate regulatory sphere, such as major emitters, financiers and insurers, government decisionmakers, and environmental not-for-profit groups? and (2) what part does climate
change litigation play in the multi-dimensional climate change regulatory system
to foster actions to reduce GHG emissions and minimize associated climate
change impacts? As noted by David Markell and J.B. Ruhl-two pioneers of
"third wave"' research in the United States-scholarship focusing on the broader
impact of litigation necessitates a comprehensive view of the case law in order to
identify trends and litigation's multiple pathways of regulatory influence. 4 9 To

42. See, e.g., Jacqueline Peel, Climate Change Law: the Emergence of a New Legal Discipline, 32
U. L. REv. 922-79 (2008).
43. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
44. 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).

MELBORNE

45. GreenpeaceAustralia Ltd. v. Redbank Power Co. [1994] 86 LGERA 143 (Austl.).
46. In the Matter of the Quantification of Environmental Costs, 578 N.W.2d 794 (Minn. App. 1998).
47. Navraj Ghaleigh, "Six honest serving men", supra note 35, at 45; see also Tim Stephens, International
Courts and Climate Change: Progression,Regression andAdministration,in IN THE WILDS OF CLIMATE CHANGE

LAw 53-70 (Rosemary Lyster ed., Australian Academic Press 2010).
48. E.g., Lin, Climate Change and the Courts, supra note 7, at 35-57; Markell & Ruhl, An Empirical
Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts,supra note 36, at 15-86; David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical
Survey of Climate Change Litigation in the United States, ENvTL. L REP., no. 7, 2010 at 10644-10655; Hari M.
Osofsky, The ContinuingImportance of Climate Change Litigation,supra note 26, at 3-29; Hari M. Osofsky, Is
Climate Change "International"?,supra note 26, at 585-650; Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Climate
Change Litigation, supra note 26, at 1789-1855; Jacqueline Peel, Issues in Climate ChangeLitigation, supra
note 38.
49. Markell & Ruhl, An EmpiricalAssessment of Climate Changein the Courts, supra note 36, at 15-86.
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that end, this article provides a conceptual mapping in Part III of regulatory
pathways for climate change litigation.

II. THE U.S. AND AUSTRALIAN REGULATORY CONTEXTS
In order to provide context for understanding these pathways, this part
provides a comparative assessment of the United States and Australian regulatory

contexts and how climate change litigation fits into them. These two contexts
provide a particularly rich environment for analyzing the role of litigation.
Beyond the fact that both countries have been the sites of a tremendous amount of
litigation and so contain significant amounts of data to analyze, they also are both
major emitters with a significant investment in coal and other fossil fuel
resources, and have been slow to take action at international and national levels.

Although Australia has surpassed the United States in recent years by becoming
party to the Kyoto Protocol and implementing national climate change legislation, litigation has played a significant role in shaping the regulatory paths of both
of these common law jurisdictions. This part compares the role of climate change
litigation in the two countries by examining each of them individually, and then
considering convergences and divergences.

A.

U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE REGULATION

The United States plays a pivotal role in global efforts to reduce GHG
emissions because of its massive total and per capita contribution. As of 2005, the
United States is the second biggest total emitter in the world, surpassed only by
China, and 2009 data shows the same ranking for carbon dioxide emissions.o
The 2009 per capita carbon dioxide emissions of the United States ranked it
seventeenth in the world.51 Moreover, U.S. emissions continue to increase over
time. In 2012, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reported that
total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions increased by 11 percent from 1990 to 2010
and 3.3 percent from 2009 to 2010.52
Carbon dioxide emissions, most of which are related to fossil fuel production,
comprised 83.3 percent of total U.S. emissions as of 2010. Fossil fuel carbon
dioxide emissions increased 14 percent between 1990 and 2010-and 3.7 percent
between 2009 and 2010 alone--due to a combination of a generally growing
economy over that twenty-year period and growth in emissions from electricity

50. LARRY PARKER & JOHN BLODGETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL32721, GREENHOUSE GAS EMIssioNs:
PERSPECTIVE ON THE ToP 20 EMITERS AND DEVELOPED VERSUS DEVELOPING NAITONS (2010); Mark McCormick

& Paul Scruton, World CarbonDioxide Emissions Data by Country, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 31 2011, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/20 11 /jan/31/world-carbon-dioxide-emissions-country-data-co2?
intcmp=239.
51. Mark McCormick & Paul Scruton, World CarbonDioxide Emissions Data by Country, supra note 50.
52. E.P.A., DRAFT INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKs: 1990-2010 (2012).
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generation and transportation. In 2010, electricity generation accounted for 34
percent, transportation accounted for 27 percent, and industrial emissions accounted for 20 percent of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Agricultural,
commercial, and residential sectors provided the other 19 percent of emissions.5 3
In 2010, U.S. energy consumption among various sources was: 37 percent
petroleum, 25.8 percent natural gas, 21.8 percent coal, 8.8 percent nuclear, and
5.9 percent renewable energy. 54 The World Energy Council's 2008 data puts U.S.
supply and use of its three largest energy sources in global perspective. The
United States is the third largest oil producer in the world, though its recoverable
resources lag well behind major Middle East producers. It also contains the
world's sixth largest proved reserves of natural gas, almost 4 percent of the world
total. Finally, U.S. recoverable coal resources, 237,295 million tons, were by far
the largest in the world and 28 percent of the global total; the United States was
also second in the world for coal production and eleventh in the world for coal
used in energy generation. 5
Despite the important U.S. contribution to GHG emissions, its regulation of
them.has lagged. The following sections detail U.S. regulatory approaches at
international, national, and sub-national levels, and the ways in which litigation
has helped to shape the domestic regulatory approach.
1. United States and the International Climate Change Regime
The United States is party to the UNFCCC and actively participates in
negotiations under it. However, it has lagged behind other major emitters in its
willingness to make binding commitments. Although President Clinton's administration helped to shape the Kyoto Protocol through U.S. negotiating positions,
the U.S. Senate provided such clear opposition to ratification that President
Clinton did not even submit the treaty to that body. The Senate unanimously
passed a resolution stating that the United States should not become party to the
Kyoto Protocol due to its exclusion of developing country major emitters like
China and India. 56 Under President George W. Bush's leadership, the United
States further reinforced its unwillingness to participate in the Kyoto Protocol.5 7
President Obama brought the United States back into more active participation
in the UNFCCC and even played a pivotal role in negotiating the 2009
Copenhagen Accord, but the U.S. international-level position has not changed
fundamentally. The nation remains outside of the Kyoto Protocol regime, even as
some Parties agreed to a second commitment period at the 2011 Durban and 2012
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, SURVEY OF ENERGY RESOURCEs 2010 (World Energy Council 22d ed. 2010).

56. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997).
57. George W. Bush, Pres., United States of America, Speech Discussing Global Climate Change (2008)
(transcript on file with author).
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Doha negotiations. Instead, the United States continues to press for a universal
regime and has made limited voluntary commitments under the Copenhagen
Accord.58
Litigation has not influenced the U.S. international posture substantially. The
Inuit's petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights-claiming
that U.S. climate change policy violated the human rights of its U.S. and
Canadian citizens-was rejected and does not appear to have changed the formal
U.S. position. In contrast, domestic litigation, discussed in more depth below,
has fundamentally shaped the U.S. national-level approach. These national-level
regulatory impacts affect the global contribution of the United States, but have
not for the most part been connected directly to the U.S. negotiating position or
commitments under climate change treaties. The closest tie was when the Obama
Administration announced regulatory action pursuant to the Supreme Court
decision in Massachusettsv. EPA just before the 2009 Copenhagen negotiations
that occurred in the aftermath of comprehensive climate change legislation
failing in the U.S. Congress.6 0
2. Federal Climate Change Regulation
The United States has limited statutory law directly focused on climate change,
but has a long-standing robust regime of broader environmental law. Advocates
for greater regulation of climate change have pushed for regulation through
lawsuits under that more general environmental law. This litigation, particularly
under the Clean Air Act paired with the Administrative Procedure Act, has served
as a primary driver of federal climate change regulation. Agency action under
energy law and economic recovery law complement that environmental regulation. The United States seems likely to continue along this regulatory path for the
foreseeable future. Unlike in Australia, which as discussed in Section II.B has
legislated to introduce a nationwide carbon price, the U.S. Congress appears to
lack sufficient political support to pass comprehensive climate change legislation."
In addition to these air pollution control efforts relevant to climate change, the
United States has had a limited statutory regime directly focused on climate
change. The 1978 National Climate Program Act focused on forwarding scientific understanding of climate change, and President Carter commissioned a

58. Hari M. Osofsky, Suburban Climate Change Efforts, supra note 21.
59. Hari M. Osofsky, The Continuing Importance of Climate Change Litigation, supra note 26, at 3-29;
Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from
Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States (Dec. 7, 2005).
60. John M. Broder, Greenhouse Gases Imperil Health, EPA Announces, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 8, 2009, at A18,
www.nytimes.com/2009/12/08/science/earth/08epa.html?r= l&emc=etal (viewed Dec. 21, 2009); Hari M.
Osofsky, The Continuing Importanceof Climate ChangeLitigation,supra note 26, at 7.
61. Hari M. Osofsky, DiagonalFederalismand Climate Change, supra note 26.
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National Research Council Report under that Act.62 The 1987 Global Climate
Protection Act built on the 1978 law, with a focus on establishing "coordinated
national policy," forwarding U.S. international leadership on climate change, and
supporting additional data collection. Neither of these laws require specific
mitigation action, and efforts to pass comprehensive climate change legislation
beyond these statutes have repeatedly failed. 4
The U.S. Clean Air Act, 6 5 the statute under which the most significant
litigation and regulation has occurred, was first passed in 1963.66 It built upon the
1955 Air Pollution Control Act and has been amended many times, most
significantly in the 1970 amendments that brought it into its modem formulation.67 Other legislation targeting the environment, energy, and economic recovery also have a significant impact on U.S. emissions and, at times, have been a
focus of litigation. For example, suits under the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) 68 have attempted to incorporate climate change into environmental
assessments and actions under the Endangered Species Act have attempted to list
species as threatened or endangered based on climate change. The Energy Policy
Act of 2005 established national interest electric transmission corridors, which
could help bring more renewable energy onto the grid, but legal challenges have
slowed the federal government's efforts to implement these corridors.69 The
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 resulted in substantial
investment in energy efficiency and renewable energy.70
Recent U.S. regulation of motor vehicles and power plants under the Clean Air
Act stems from the U.S. Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Massachusetts v.
EPA." In that case, petitioners challenged the U.S. EPA's denial of a petition
requesting that it regulate motor vehicles' GHG emissions under section 202(a)(1)
of the Clean Air Act. The parties to the petition mirrored the sub-national
divisions in the United States that will be explored more in the next section.
Twelve states, a U.S. territory, three cities, and thirteen nongovernmental organizations pushed for the regulation, while the EPA, ten other states, and nineteen
62. U.S. National Climate Program Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2901-07 (2006); CLIMATE RESEARCH BD., CARBON
DIOXIDE & CLIMATE: A ScIENTIFic ASSESSMENT, (Nat'I Acad. Press 1979).
63. Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, 15 U.S.C. § 2901 (1992); see also Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal
Federalismand Climate Change, supra note 26.
64. Hari M. Osofsky, DiagonalFederalism and Climate Change, supra note 26.
65. U.S. Clean Air Act of 1963,42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006).
66. Id.
67. Id. § 7401; U.S. Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006); see also Hari M.
Osofsky, DiagonalFederalismand Climate Change, supra note 26.
68. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1969).
69. Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challengesfor Renewable Energy:A
FederalismMismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801 (2012); Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah Wiseman, Dynamic Energy
Federalism,MARYLAND L. REv. (forthcoming 2012).
70. U.S. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 Pub. L. No. 111-5 (2009); see also Hari M.
Osofsky, DiagonalFederalismand Climate Change,supra note 26.
71. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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industry and utility groups opposed it. 7 2
Massachusetts v. EPA has shaped federal climate change regulation not only
through its direct regulatory impact, but also because of the way in which it
approached threshold and substantive issues. Most significantly regarding threshold issues like standing, it decided that at least the state of Massachusetts had
sufficient interest in the case to have standing before the Court and that the state
had made claims which could satisfy the requirements of injury, causation, and
remedy. This ruling both made it easier for other governments to establish
standing in future cases and, through its focus on the special sovereign nature of
Massachusetts, created substantial uncertainty over whether nongovernmental
petitioners would have standing. Substantively, despite a deferential standard of
review, the Supreme Court decided that the Clean Air Act's broad definition of air
pollutant applied to GHG emissions despite their substantial differences from the
types of pollutants, like those contributing to smog, which were the initial focus
of the Act. It found that the EPA had abused its discretion through the manner in
which it justified not regulating greenhouse gas emissions and required it to
"ground its reasons for action or inaction in the statute."7
In the several years since this decision, Congress has passed neither legislation
to eliminate this Clean Air Act regulatory authority nor additional legislation
directly addressing climate change. As a result, EPA regulation pursuant to this
decision-often in collaboration with other federal agencies, state governments,
and relevant industries-has served as the core of the U.S. federal efforts on
climate change. Although the Bush Administration did not act on the Massachusetts v. EPA decision in its final months in office, the Obama Administration
began taking steps pursuant to the decision immediately upon entering office. It
both commenced considering whether GHG emissions from motor vehicles
endanger public health and welfare and whether California should receive a
waiver to regulate motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions. Since making the
endangerment finding and granting the waiver, the U.S. EPA has created
substantial new regulations for both motor vehicles and major stationary sources
of GHG emissions. Its regulation of motor vehicle GHG emissions combines
authority under the Clean Air Act with that under the Energy Policy Conservation
Act of 197574 and other clean air legislation due to the fragmented nature of U.S.
law applicable to motor vehicles.
This regulatory approach remains controversial. Those supportive of regulation tend to view regulation under the Clean Air Act as less desirable than
comprehensive legislation focused on climate change, while those opposed to

72. Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change "International"?,supra note 26, 585-650.
73. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535 (2007); see also Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change
"International"?,supra note 26, at 585-650.
74. U.S. Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 32,901-16 (2009).
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regulation continue to view it as inappropriate. 5 These regulations have been
challenged in U.S. courts, but in June 2012, the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia upheld them in a per curiam opinion. The court concluded: "1) the
Endangerment Finding and Tailpipe Rule are neither arbitrary nor capricious; 2)
EPA's interpretation of the governing [Clean Air Act] CAA provisions is
unambiguously correct; and 3) no petitioner has standing to challenge the Timing
and Tailoring Rules."" In December 2012, the D.C. Circuit denied rehearing
en banc, and so to date these regulations appear to be withstanding judicial
challenge.
In addition to lawsuits focused on forcing or limiting governmental regulation
of GHG emissions, a smaller subset of claims in U.S. federal courts have focused
directly on major corporate emitters under federal common law nuisance doctrine. In June 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court produced its second climate change
ruling in one of these nuisance cases, American Electric Power v. Connecticut.7 8
With respect to threshold issues, a four justice plurality-with Justice Sotomayor
recusing herself-reaffirmed Massachusetts v. EPA's approach to standing and
also held that no other threshold issues barred review. This decision on threshold
issues did not analyze the political question doctrine-which had been an issue in
lower courts-in any depth, but indicated that it would not pose a barrier to
review. However, after finding that these public nuisance claims fell within the
limited parameters of federal common law, the Court used the displacement
doctrine to foreclose federal public nuisance as a pathway so long as the EPA
retained its authority to regulate GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act. In the
process of its analysis, the Court reinforced regulatory suits under the Clean Air
Act and Administrative Procedure Act as an appropriate way to shape the path of
climate change regulation. The Court did not reach the question of whether state
law nuisance claims were preempted, an issue that has not yet been resolved in
other courts. 79
Thus, at the federal level in the United States climate change regulation is
proceeding along pathways shaped by the Supreme Court despite the lack of
political will to produce comprehensive legislation. This approach leaves U.S.

75. Hari M. Osofsky, Litigations Role in the Path of U.S. Federal Climate Change Regulation, supra
note 25.
76. Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 113-14 (D.C. Cir., June 26, 2012) (No.
09-1322, 10-1092).
77. Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. E.P.A., 2012 WL 6621785 (D.C. Cir., Dec 20, 2012) (No.
09-1322, 10-1024, 10-1025, 10-1026, 10-1030, 10-1035, 10-1036, 10-1037, 10-1038) (denying rehearing
en banc).
78. 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
79. American Electric Power v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011); see also Hari M. Osofsky, Litigation's
Role in the Path of U.S. FederalClimate Change Regulation,supra note 25. For a summary of all U.S. climate
change nuisance cases, see MICHAEL GERRARD ET AL, CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, COLUMBIA LAw SCHOOL,
U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE LmGATION CHART, available at http://web.law.columbia.edu/climate-change/resources/

us-climate-change-litigation-chart.
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regulation vulnerable to changes in presidential administrations that influence the
enforcement efforts by the U.S. EPA and other agencies, and to ongoing legal
challenges. However, the inertia in the U.S. Senate that stymies the passage of
comprehensive climate change legislation will also likely prevent legislative
action to strip the U.S. EPA of its authority to regulate GHG emissions under the
Clean Air Act.
3. State- and Local-Based Climate Change Regulation
Due to the federal system of government in the United States, state and local
governments have substantial powers relevant to climate change mitigation and
adaptation. Specifically, most land use planning and energy decision-making
occurs at sub-national levels. In addition, the federal environmental statutes have
numerous provisions that allow states flexibility in implementation and, at times,
opportunities to exceed federal standards. These provisions vary in whether they
set a minimum standard for states (floor preemption), mandate particular standards for states (ceiling preemption), or defer to the states with minimal
preemption. As a consequence of these various powers, state and local governments, along with interstitial regional entities, form an important part of the U.S.
regulatory landscape relevant to climate change.
As at the federal level, litigation has played a crucial role in state and local
regulatory approaches. States and localities have been parties in lawsuits over
federal regulation, states have sued the federal government to have the ability to
regulate GHGs more stringently than federal agencies, state and localities have
faced lawsuits over their climate change statutes and regulations, states have sued
their localities to force climate change regulation, and state courts have heard a
diverse set of claims involving climate change. 80 For example, cities and states
were parties in both Massachusetts v. EPA and AEP v. Connecticut.8' California
sued the EPA over its denial of a waiver that would allow the state to regulate
motor vehicle GHG emissions prior to the Obama Administration granting the
waiver, which ended the case.8 2 California is currently facing challenges to its

80. Hari Osofsky has discussed these roles of states and cities in depth in previous scholarship. See Osofsky,
Climate Change Litigation as PluralistLegal Dialogue?, supra note 12; Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change
"International"?,supra note 26; Hari M. Osofsky, Scaling "Local": The Implications of Greenhouse Gas
Regulation in San Bernardino County, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 689 (2009); Hari M. Osofsky, Suburban Climate
Change Efforts: Possibilitiesfor Small and Nimble Cities Participatingin State, Regional, National, and
InternationalNetworks, _ CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POLICY -

(forthcoming 2013) (in press).

81. American Electric Power v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,
535 (2007).
82. For the U.S. EPA's waiver denial under the Bush Administration, see Letter from Stephen L. Johnson,
Adn'r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of Cal. (Dec. 19, 2007), available at
http://ag.ca.gov/cms attachments/press/pdfs/nl5l4_epa-letter.pdf. For California's Petition for Review to the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, see Petition for Review of Decision of the United States Environmental
Protection Agency, California v. EPA, No. 08-70011 (9th Cir. Jan. 2, 2008), available at http://ag.ca.gov/

2013]

LITIGATION's REGULATORY PATHWAYS

227

state climate change laws and has sued San Bernardino County for failing to
include climate change in its general plan. 8 3 Numerous challenges to projects,
particularly involving coal-fired power plants, have been heard in state courts. 8 4
As these examples indicate, the deep divides among states and localities regarding climate change complicate the regulatory role of these lawsuits; some states
and localities support stronger regulation and some oppose it."
By far the most common type of climate change lawsuit in the United States is
that challenging coal-fired power plants. While many of these cases are litigated
in federal courts, a substantial number take place in state-level tribunals due to
the critical state role in land use planning and energy regulation. 8 6 This litigation,
even when ultimately unsuccessful, often delays projects involving coal-fired
power plants or makes them more expensive. In the aggregate, these cases over
power plants, and the other diverse regulatory roles that U.S. states and localities
play as they interact with litigation, have a substantial influence over the overall
U.S. regulatory approach.
B.

AUSTRALIAN CLIMATE CHANGE REGULATION

As in the United States, climate change regulation in Australia has encountered
significant political obstacles and has been forced to navigate federal-state
tensions over the issue. Central to the Australian climate change regulatory story
is the country's economic dependence on fossil fuel production and exports,
particularly coal. Coal is Australia's largest commodity export, earning the

cms_attachments/press/pdfs/nl514_epapetition-I.pdf [hereinafter Petition for Review].
83. See Petition for Writ of Mandate at 12, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino, No. 07
Civ. 293 (Cal. Super. Ct., County of San Bernardino Sept. I1, 2007), availableat http://www.communityrights.
org/PDFs/Petition_(0001 1023).PDF (last visited June 13, 2009); Order Regarding Settlement, People v. County
of San Bernardino, No. 07 Civ. 329 (Cal. Super. Ct., County of San Bernardino Aug. 28, 2007), available at
http://ag.ca.gov/cms.pdfs/press/2007-08-21_SanBernardinosettlement-agreement.pdf (last visited June 13,
2009); Petition for Writ of Mandate at 2, People v. County of San Bernardino, No. 07 Civ. 329 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
County of San Bernardino Apr. 13, 2007), available at http://ag.ca.gov/globalwarming/pdf/SanBernardino
complaint.pdf (last visited June 13, 2009); Osofsky, Scaling "Local", supra note 80.
84. For a summary of these cases, see GERRARD ET AL, U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE LrrlGATION CHART, supra note

79.
85. Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What is Motivating State and Local
Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About Federalism and Environmental
Law?, THE URBAN LAWYER, no. 38, 2006 at 1015-29; REID EWING ET AL., GROWING COOLER: EVIDENCE ON
URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE (Michael Faure & Marjan Peeters eds., Edward Elgar 2008); Hari

M. Osofsky, Litigation's Role in the Path of U.S. FederalClimate Change Regulation, supra note 25; Hari M.
Osofsky, The IntersectionofScience, Scale, and Law in Massachusetts v. EPA, 9 OR. REV. INT'L L. 233, 233-60
(2007); Hari M. Osofsky & Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of Networks: Local Climate Change Coalitions, 8
CHICAGO J. INT'L L. 409 (2008); Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the
Potentialfor BidirectionalClimate Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669, 669-746 (2010).
86. Markell & Ruhl, An EmpiricalAssessment of Climate Change in the Courts, supra note 36, at 15-86;
MICHAEL GERRARD ET AL, CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, COLUMBIA LAw SCHOOL, NON U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE
LmGATION CHARr, available at https://www.law.columbia.edulnull/download?&exclusive= filemgr.download&
fileid=551343.
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country around $36 billion in 2009-20 10.87 Australia has the fourth largest
proved recoverable coal reserves and is currently the largest coal exporter in the
world." The majority of Australian coal mining and other fossil fuel production
(current and planned) is concentrated in the States of Queensland, Western
Australia, and New South Wales. Consequently, there has been strong political
support in these states for policies that support continuing high levels of fossil
fuel production and export.
Within Australia, energy production is also heavily dependent on fossil fuel
energy sources. In the financial year 2009-2010, brown and black coal supplied
37.5 percent of Australia's energy consumption, while oil supplied 34.6 percent
and gas 23.1 percent. Renewable energy sources, including hydroelectric and
wind power, supplied the remaining 4.8 percent.8 9 Emissions from electricity
power generation thus form the lion's share (thirty-seven percent) of Australia's
overall GHG emissions profile. 90 Other significant contributors to Australian
GHG emissions are the transport sector (fifteen percent) and agriculture (fifteen
percent). Unlike many other developed countries whose emissions profiles
decreased with the global financial downturn, Australia's annual emissions are
growing, largely due to increases in fugitive and other emissions associated with
booming fossil fuel production. 9 ' Australia also has very high per capita
emissions: with the exception of Luxembourg, Australia produces more carbon
pollution per person than any other developed country in the world.9 2
In global terms, Australia's annual GHG emissions represent less than 1.5
percent of total emissions,93 positioning the country as the world's fifteenth
largest emitter.94 It is important to appreciate, however, that this figure accounts
only for onshore emissions; emissions that result from combustion of the fossil
fuels Australia exports overseas are not counted in the national inventorying
process." When these emissions are factored in,96 Australia jumps up to around

87. CLARA CUEVAS-CUBRIA, ET AL., ENERGY IN AUSTRALIA 2011, at 2 (ABARES 2011).
88. WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, SURVEY OF ENERGY RESOURCEs 2010, at 5 (World Energy Council 22d ed.,

2010).
89. ANDREW SCHULTZ & REBECCA PETCHEY, ENERGY UPDATE 2011, at 4 (ABARES 2011).
90. COMMONWEALTH OF AusTL., SECURING A CLEAN ENERGY FUTURE: THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT'S
CLIMATE CHANGE PLAN, at 13 (2011).
91. Indeed, the Australian federal Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency predicts "business
as usual" emissions growth of 22 percent between 2000 and 2020. See COMMONWEALTH OF AusTL., SECURING A
CLEAN ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 90, at 15 (2011).
92. Ross GARNAUT, GARNAUT CLIMATE CHANGE REVIEW: FINAL REPORT (2008).
93. COMMONWEALTH OF AusTL., SECURING A CLEAN ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 90, at 11 (2011). See also
DEP'T OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY, COMMONWEALTH OF AusT., AUSTRALIAS NATIONAL
GREENHOUSE GAS ACCOUNTS: STATE AND TERRITORY GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORIES 2009 (2011).

94. Mark McCormick & Paul Scruton, World Carbon Dioxide Emissions Data by Country, supra note 50.
95. This inventorying process is conducted under the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007
(NGER Act), described infra.

96. James Goodman & David Worth, The Minerals Boom and Australias "Resource Curse," J. OF AusT.
POL. ECON., no. 61, 2008 at 201-19.
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the tenth largest emitter, ahead of countries with larger populations, such as the
United Kingdom. Moreover, if current plans for increasing fossil energy exports
are realized, Australia's carbon footprint may reach 2.2 billion tons per year by
2030,97 making it the world's third or fourth largest contributor to global
warming. In the absence of a robust international regime, targeted to achievement
of sustainable emissions levels (such as the levels necessary to avoid warming of
greater than two degrees Celsius), the policies of countries, such as Australia, that
are large fossil fuel exporters assume greater significance.
1. Australia and the International Climate Change Regime
Reflecting its domestic political and economic priorities around fossil fuel
production and export, Australia's record of engagement with the international
climate change regime has been mixed. Under the federal Labor government led
by Bob Hawke and Paul Keating (1983-1996), there was significant political
support for Australia's participation in the international climate change regime
and Australia was one of the first nation-states to ratify the UNFCCC. By the time
of finalization of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations in 1997, however, the federal
political context had altered dramatically with the election of the conservative
Howard government in 1996. Australia's new federal government participated in
the Kyoto negotiations, securing key concessions in the Protocol's text.9 8
The Howard government subsequently signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998.
However, its close ties to the Bush administration in the United States led the
Australian government to follow the Bush administration when the latter rejected
the Protocol in 2001. On World Environment Day in 2002, Prime Minister John
Howard announced that Australia would strive to meet its Kyoto Protocol target,
but would not ratify the treaty due to its potential to damage the Australian

97. FERGUs GREEN AND REUBEN FINIGHAN, LAGGARD To LEADER: How AusTRAA CAN LEAD THE WORLD TO
ZERO CARBON PROSPERITY, at 11 (2012).
98. CLIVE HAMILON, SCORCHER: THE DIRTY POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (Black Inc. 2007) at 74. These
concessions included a generous first commitment period emissions reduction target for Australia of 108
percent of 1990 levels and inclusion of the so-called "Australia clause" in article 3.7: Clive Hamilton & Lins
Vellen, Land-Use Change in Australia and the Kyoto Protocol,2 ENVTL. Sci. & Pot'Y 145 (1999). Article 3.7 of
the Protocol is known as the "Australia clause" as it applies almost exclusively to Australia as the only
developed country that had significant land-clearing emissions in 1990. Id at 145. In effect this provision
allowed Australia to include net emissions from land clearing, which were very high during the 1980s, in the
calculation of its 1990 emission levels that formed the baseline for emission cuts over the first commitment
period. Because emissions from land clearing dropped sharply after 1990, the effect of the artificially high base
line was to reduce the emission reductions necessary in other sectors of the Australian economy to meet its first
commitment period target. Australia's Fifth National Communication on Climate Change, submitted to the
UNFCCC Secretariat in March 2010, indicated that Australia was on track to meet its Kyoto target without
relying on the Protocol's flexibility mechanisms, with emissions projected to reach 106 percent of 1990 levels
over the first commitment period. See COMMONWEALTH OF AusTL., AUsTRALDA: AusTRALIA's FIFrH NATIONAL
COMMUNICATION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2010), at 6.
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economy. 99 In view of Australia's small contribution to global GHG emissions
(in absolute, rather than per capita, terms), the Howard federal government's
refusal to join the Kyoto Protocol was not significant in delaying the entry into
force of the Protocol (unlike that of the United States). It was only when the
government of Prime Minister Kevin Rudd was elected in 2007 that Australia
finally ratified the Kyoto Protocol, some two-and-a-half years after its entry into
force on February 16, 2005.
In the ongoing negotiations concerning future international arrangements,
Australia has proved to be a rather fickle friend of the Kyoto process, often taking
positions closely aligned with that of the United States. At the Copenhagen
conference in December 2009 Australia was one of a number of developed
countries to advocate the disbanding of the Kyoto Protocol and its replacement
with a new treaty that would impose binding emissions reduction cuts on both
developed and developing countries.'" The failure of the Copenhagen conference to produce such a treaty, or anything approaching it, delivered a heavy blow
to the Rudd Labor government, which had tied the fate of its domestic mitigation
measures in the form of the "Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme" to the
emergence of a comprehensive (i.e., covering both developed countries and
major developing country emitters) international agreement on cutting GHG
emissions. Australia was, however, quick to associate itself with the non-binding
Copenhagen Accord, submitting self-determined emission-reduction targets in
January 2010: an unconditional pledge to reduce emissions by five percent of
2000 levels by 2020, with additional reductions of up to fifteen percent and
twenty-five percent possible depending upon the level of action taken by other
states.o'" The 25 percent reduction will apply if there is "an ambitious global deal
capable of stabilising levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at 450 ppm
C0 2 -eq or lower." 10 2
More recently, and perhaps in light of the introduction of new domestic carbon
pricing measures,10 3 Australia changed tack once again in its international
climate policy. In September 2011, in the lead-up to Durban COP17, Australia
and Norway issued a joint proposal designed to sketch out a pathway for global
climate negotiations to agree by 2015 on a "legal agreement with binding

99. GUY PEARSE, HIGH AND DRY JOHN HOWARD, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE SELLING OF AUSTRALIA'S FUTURE

(Penguin Books Australia 2007).
100. COMMONWEALTH OF AuSTL., AUSTRALIA: LEGAL ARCHITECTURE FOR A POST-2012 OUTCOME (2009),
availableat http://www.climatechange.gov.au/govemment/intemational//media/submissions/international/LegalArchitecture-Post-2012-Outcome-Australian-submission-MAY-09.pdf.
101. COMMONWEALTH OF AusTL., QUANTIFIED ECONOMY WIDE EMISSIONS TARGETS FOR 2020 (2010),

availableat http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/application/pdf/australiacphaccord-appl.pdf.
102. United Framework Convention on Climate Change, Copenhagen Accord Appendix 1 Quantified
economy-wide emissions targets for 2020 (2010), availableat http://unfccc.int/meetings/copenhagendec_2009/
items/5264.php.

103. See section HI.B.2 infra.
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mitigation commitments by both developed and developing countries, especially
from major economies."'0 The Durban COP was hailed as a success by the
Australian government for delivering on what it claimed were Australia's key
objectives going into the negotiations, namely, building on the emissionreduction pledges made at previous COPs, moving towards a legal framework to
cover all major emitters, and promoting market mechanisms. 0 5 The extension of
the Kyoto Protocol to a second commitment period that commenced January 1,
2013, was also a favorable decision from Australia's perspective since it enabled
the carbon market (and its supply of cheap international credits for the purposes
of meeting domestic compliance obligations) to continue under the Clean
Development Mechanism.' 0 6 Shortly before the Doha COP in December 2012,
Australia announced that it would participate in the Protocol's second commitment period.' 0 7 However, the prospects for continuing robust Australian engagement with the UNFCCC look dim following the election of a new conservative
government in September 2013. Prime Minister Tony Abbott has declared his
government's "first order of business" will be to repeal the legislation for the
national carbon pricing mechanism introduced by the previous government to
implement Australia's international climate change commitment.'s
Like the United States, Australia has not been directly influenced by international-level litigation in its international negotiating positions. The main international-level petitions relevant to Australia have been requests to the World
Heritage Committee for listing of Australian world heritage sites, including the
Great Barrier Reef, as "in danger" due to climate change.' 09 However, like the
Inuit Inter-American petition in the U.S. context, these petitions-which, with

104. Enhanced Action on Mitigation, Austl.-Nor., Mar. 18, 2011, U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/201 1/INF.1 at
2 (2011).
105. Media Release, Greg Combet, Minister for Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, Commonwealth of
Austl., Breakthrough at Durban Climate Change Conference (Dec. 11, 2011) available at http://www.climate
change.gov.aulminister/greg-combet/20 1/media-releases/December/mr20l 1121l.aspx.
106. Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under
the Kyoto Protocol at its sixteenth session, 15 Mar., 2012, Decision 1/CMP.7, FCCC/KP/CMP/201 1/10/Add. 1
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cmp7/eng/l0a01.pdf. [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol Further
Commitments].
107. Media Release, Greg Combet, Minister for Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, Commonwealth of
Austl., Australia Ready to Join Kyoto Second Commitment Period (Nov. 9, 2012) available at http://
www.climatechange.gov.aulminister/greg-combet/2012/media-releases/November/MR-302-12.aspx. Before his
election as the new Australian Prime Minister in September 2013, Tony Abbott indicated his party's in principle
support for Australia's participation in a Kyoto second commitment period. Sarah Clarke and Andrew Greene,
Environmental Policy: Where the Parties Stand, ABC News, http://www.abc.net.aulnews/federal-election-2013/
policy/climate-change.
108. Jamie Walker, Carbon tax my first target: Tony Abbott, THE AUSTRALIAN, Aug. 5, 2013, http://www.
theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/election-2013/carbon-tax-my-first-target-tony-abbott/story-fn9qr68y1226691369048.
109. DONALD R. ROTHWELL, SYDNEY CTR. FOR INT'L AND GLOBAL LAW, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE

GREAT BARRIER REEF: AUSTRALIA'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE WORLD HERITAGE CONVENTION (Sept. 21, 2004),

available at http://www.law.usyd.edu.aulscigl/SCIGLFinalReport21_ 09_04.pdf.
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others focused on sites in additional countries, resulted in further study by the
World Heritage Committee but no danger listing-may have indirectly influenced Australian's evolving approach to the UNFCCC regime." 0
2. Federal Climate Change Legislation
Under the Australian Constitution, the federal government has primary legislative responsibility for the enactment of legislation implementing international
treaty obligations such as those under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol."'
Prior to 2007, however, federal climate change legislation was sparse, reflecting
the Howard government's policy position that "[t]aking precipitate or costly
action to reduce emissions if not placed within a sensible international and
domestic framework, would erode Australian industry's ability to compete
internationally
and would impose serious and damaging costs on the Australian
2
economy."" 1
As a consequence, most of the climate change measures introduced during the
tenure of the Howard government were voluntary in nature and focused primarily
on "no regrets" interventions such as promoting energy efficiency.' 1 3 The only
mandatory legislative scheme introduced by the Howard government was the
Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (that continues as the Renewable Energy
Target today), which sought to increase the share of electricity produced using
renewable sources by a very modest two percent by 2010.' 14 This scheme was
substantially overhauled by the incoming Rudd Labor government, which increased the target to a twenty percent renewables share by 2020.' The other key
110. Petition to the World Heritage Committee Requesting Inclusion of Belize Barrier Reef Reserve System
in the List of World Heritage in Danger as a Result of Climate Change and for Protective Measures & Actions
(Nov. 15, 2004), available at http://www.climatelaw.org/media/UNESCO.petitions.release/belize.barrier.reef.
doc [hereinafter Belize Petition]; Petition to the World Heritage Committee Requesting Inclusion of the
Huascaran National Park in the List of World Heritage in Danger as a Result of Climate Change (Nov. 17, 2004),
availableat http://www.climatelaw.org/media/UNESCO.petitions.release/peru.huascaran.national.park.doc [hereinafter Peru Petition]; Petition to the World Heritage Committee Requesting Inclusion of Sagarmatha National
Park in the List of World Heritage in Danger as a Result of Climate Change and for Protective Measures &
Actions (Nov. 15, 2004), available at http://www.climatelaw.org/media/UNESCO.petitions.release/nepal.sagar
matha.national.park.doc; see U.N. Educ., Scientific & Cultural Org. World Heritage Comm., Decisions of the
29th Session of the World Heritage Committee (Durban 2005), Decision 29 COM 7B.a (Sept. 9, 2005),
availableat http://whc.unesco.org/ archive/2005/whc05-29com-22e.pdf [hereinafter Decision 29 COM 7B.a];
Richard Black, UN Investigates Everest Threat, BBC NEWS, July 14, 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/ sci/tech/4682437.stm; Petition to the World Heritage Committee Requesting Inclusion of Waterton-Glacier
International Peace Park on the List of World Heritage in Danger as a Result of Climate Change and for
Protective Measures and Actions (Feb. 16, 2006), available at http://law.Iclark.edu/org/ielp/objects/WatertonGlacierPetition2.15.06.pdf.
11l. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION §51(29).
112. Nick Minchin, Responding to Climate Change: Providing a Policy Framework for a Competitive

Australia, 24 UNSW L.J.F. 550, 550-55 (2001).
113. See, e.g. Energy Efficiency Opportunities Act 2006 (Cth) (Austl.).
114. Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth) (Austl.).
115. Id.
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piece of legislation enacted by the Howard government was the National
Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act, 2007 (NGER Act).1 16 This legislation
introduced a national scheme for the reporting of information about corporate
greenhouse emissions, energy production, and energy consumption. In and of
itself, the NGER Act does not institute any requirement for reporting corporations to decrease their GHG emissions as it is purely a procedural and informative
mechanism. The broader significance of the NGER Act stems from its capacity to
supply the necessary reporting infrastructure for emissions trading: the function it
serves under the Australian carbon pricing mechanism.
After a tortuous political process, which saw the fall of leaders of both major
parties and the jettisoning of a proposed "Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme"" 7
(CPRS) in November 2011, the Australian government, led by Prime Minister
Julia Gillard, subsequently passed a legislative package introducing a "carbon
pricing mechanism,""' as well as foreshadowing a range of complementary
regulatory measures." 9 Unlike the previous CPRS proposal, framed in expectation of the emergence of an international agreement at Copenhagen, the new
carbon pricing scheme was introduced despite acknowledgement of the uncertainty over future multilateral action.
As a country whose economic health is closely tied to emissions-intensive
forms of energy generation and exports of coal and other fossil fuels,' 2 0 one
might expect that any national emissions trading scheme (ETS) adopted in
Australia would be modest and heavily circumscribed in its scope and coverage.
However, a strange confluence of domestic political factors, which positioned the
Australian Greens party as a key player in the federal parliament, saw a more
far-reaching and ambitious approach taken. The national carbon pricing mechanism that took effect on July 1, 2012, applies to a range of major carbon polluters
in the stationary energy, waste, rail, domestic aviation and shipping, mining, and
industrial processes sectors. The carbon pricing mechanism commenced with a
fixed price period of three years (with a starting carbon price of $23 per ton), and
is scheduled to transition to a fully flexible ETS from July 1, 2015. While the
default emissions reduction target for the scheme is extremely modest-five
percent below 2000 levels by 2020-there is capacity for the emissions cap to be
set during the fully flexible period in light of international developments,
including more ambitious action on climate change mitigation at the global level
or in other countries and regions.121 An important element of the legislative

116. National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (Cth) (Austl.).
117. Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Bill 2009 (Austl.).
118. See Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) (Austi.); Clean Energy (Consequential Amendments) Act 2011 (Cth)
(Austl.); Clean Energy Regulator Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.); Climate Change Authority Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.).
119. COMMONWEALTH OF AusT., SECURING A CLEAN ENERGY FuTuRE, supra note 90.
120. RODNEY TIFFEN & Ross GnrINS, How AUSTRALIA COMPARES, (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 2009).

121. Clean Energy Act 2011

§ 14 (Cth)

(Austl.).
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package is the establishment of an independent Climate Change Authoritymodeled on the Committee on Climate Change established under the United
Kingdom's Climate Change Act 2008-to advise the government on appropriate
settings for the scheme's pollution caps.12 2
Despite these innovative features of the Australian carbon pricing mechanism,
many potential problems remain. The most pressing of these is the likely repeal
of the Clean Energy Act 2 3 and dismantling of associated institutions by the
Abbott government.12 4 Another important limitation of the scheme is that it
applies only to the "scope 1" (direct) emissions of liable entities.12 5 Consequently, the carbon pricing mechanism is predicted not to have a substantial
effect on the Australian coal industry since offshore emissions (that is, when
exported coal is burnt for power generation in other countries) fall outside the
regime. In the absence of any workable technological fix (carbon capture and
storage, although heavily promoted and subsidized by Australian governments, is
not yet technically or commercially viable), high levels of GHG emissions from
the combustion of Australian coal are set to continue, largely unregulated by the
centerpiece of Australia's domestic regulatory climate change response. In this
context, climate change litigation that seeks to ensure offshore emissions are
factored into local decision-making processes may be an important complement
to carbon pricing, mediating between the domestically-focused operation of the
mechanism's emissions reduction requirements and the broader global context of
GHG emissions' production and climate change effects.
3. State-Based Climate Change Regulation
As in the United States, Australia's federal governance system has facilitated
the emergence of a diverse array of climate change policies and regulatory
measures at the state level. Australia's six states enjoy substantial autonomy to
enact their own laws in the areas of climate change, land-use planning, and
environmental protection, subject to the constitutional requirement that such laws
do not conflict with federal laws that are designed to cover the field.' 2 6 A number
of the climate change measures enacted by Australian states have been fairly
progressive. The most populous Australian state, New South Wales (NSW), for
example, was the first jurisdiction in the world to introduce an ETS targeting

122. Climate Change Authority Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.).
123. Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.).
124. Sarah Clarke and Andrew Greene, Environmental Policy: Where the Parties Stand, ABC News,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/federal-election-2013/policy/climate-change. The Abbott government has shown
no wavering in its determination to repeal the "carbon tax" although the new make-up the Senate that will take
effect on July 1, 2014 when new senators take their positions may delay the repeal legislation.
125. Clean Energy Act 2011 §30 (Cth) (Austl.).
126. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION

§

109.
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GHG emissions in the energy generation sector. 1 2 7 In 2005, NSW set an
aspirational target to reduce its emissions by sixty percent from 2000 levels by
2050.128 Other states have developed their own emissions reduction targets:
South Australia has a target of forty percent below 1990 levels by 2050;129
whereas over the same period Tasmania is seeking a reduction of sixty percent on
1990 levels.' 3 0 In support of these targets, states have introduced a variety of
energy regulation measures in the form of renewable (or low emissions) energy
targets, energy efficiency measures, and regulatory schemes to promote renewable energy uptake, such as feed-in tariffs. 3 1 Overall, the pattern evident in
Australian state-based climate regulation is of a mosaic of different policies and
legislation, which while not directly contradictory, generally evince no common
approach. Instead regulations have been designed by each jurisdiction in accordance with its own circumstances and policy priorities.
The only attempt to devise a coordinated state response to climate change
came in the early 2000s when state governments, frustrated with the Howard
federal government's reluctance to adopt a national ETS, put forward their own
proposal for an inter-jurisdictional ETS, similar to regional schemes operating in
the United States such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI).13 2
However, this proposal was put aside due to the commitment by the incoming
Rudd government to introduce a national scheme in the form of the CPRS.
Although the CPRS legislation failed to secure Senate support and was shelved in
2010, legislation for the introduction of a national carbon pricing mechanism was
successfully passed in 2011. Since that time (and with changes of government in
favor of more conservative parties in a number of states), the pattern of state
engagement with the issue of climate change has been more characteristic of a
"race to the bottom" than a "race to the top." Energy regulations such as feed-in
tariffs have been rolled back in a number of states. In the State of Victoria, which
introduced a specific Climate Change Act in 2010, including powers for the state
Environment Protection Authority to regulate GHG emissions from industry and
power generators, amendments passed by the new state government in 2012
repealed these powers, as well as the Act's binding 2020 emissions reduction
target."3 3 The amendments implemented the recommendations of a review of the
127. The NSW Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme was created in 2002 through amendments to the NSW
Electricity Supply Act 1995 and the Electricity Supply (General) Regulation 2001 see New South Wales
Government Department of Trade and Investment, Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme, available at http://
www.trade.nsw.gov.au/energy/sustainable/greenhouse-gas/reduction-scheme.
128. NEW SOUTH WALES GOVERNMENT, NSW STArE PLAN-INVESTING IN A BETTER FUTURE, at 37 (2010).

129. Climate Change and Greenhouse Emissions Reduction Act 2007 § 3 (SA).
130. Climate Change (State Action) Act 2008 § 5 (Tas).
131. ROSEMARY LYSTER & ADRIAN BRADBROOK, ENERGY LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Cambridge Univ. Press

2006).
132. NAr'L EMIssioNs TRADING TASKFORCE, POSSIBLE DESIGN FOR A NATIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS EMIssIoNs
TRADING SCHEME (2006).

133. Climate Change and Environment Protection Amendment Act 2012 §§ 4 and 18.
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legislative scheme, which sought "streamlining" of the Act's provisions on the
basis that introduction of the national carbon pricing mechanism "changes the
policy role of the State Government in mitigating greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions to a complementary one."' 34
4. Planning Disputes over Coal Mines, Coal-Fired Power and Adaptation
Frustration with the slow progress of national climate change regulation under
the Howard government, gaps in the coverage of the federal carbon pricing
scheme (coupled with its likely repeal), 13 5 and the lack of a consistent, comprehensive approach to climate change regulation at the state-level have led many in
the environmental community to look to the courts as a way of fostering
regulatory momentum for a "clean energy"l 3 6 transformation in Australia.13 7 The
vast majority of such cases have been brought under land-use planning and
environmental assessment laws, which generally involve decision-making on
development applications at the state or local level. Major projects with impacts
on "matters of national environmental significance," 3 1 such as the world
heritage-listed Great Barrier Reef, may also attract federal environmental assessment requirements under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act).' 3 9
Unlike in the United States, there has been no Australian case to date seeking
to hold corporate emitters liable for damage caused by GHG emissions. 14 0
Instead, cases have generally involved public (administrative) law actions seeking judicial or merits review' 4 1 of government decision-making under applicable
134. VICIORIAN GOVERNMENT, DEP'T OF PREMIER & CABINET, REVIEW OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE Act 2010

(2011).
135. Motor vehicle emissions and agriculture are also major omissions from the coverage of the scheme,
alongside offshore emissions from Australian fossil fuels.
136. "Clean energy" is used in different ways by different authors. Here we use it to mean energy sources
with zero carbon emissions. However, the term can also encompass low emissions sources, such as natural gas.
See, e.g., the definition used by the Australian Government: "clean energy" is "sources of energy, technologies
or processes that produce lower or zero greenhouse gas emissions relative to conventional counterparts and that
meet appropriate social, environmental, health and safety standards." AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT
OF RESOURCES, ENERGY AND TOURISM, DRAFT ENERGY WHrrE PAPER: STRENGTHENING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR
AUSTRALIA'S ENERGY FUTURE, at 198 (2011).

137. Jacqueline Peel, The Role of Climate Change Litigation in Australia'sResponse to Global Warming, 24
ENvnT. & PLAN. L.J. 90, 90-105 (2007).
138. Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (Austl.) § 1.
139. Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (Austl.) § 12.
140. The case of Gray v. MacquarieGeneration(2010/2011) came close, with the claimants seeking to hold
Bayswater power station liable for its carbon dioxide emissions under NSW pollution control legislation.
However, despite partially succeeding before the NSW Land and Environment court, the case was struck out by
the NSW Court of Appeal on the basis that the power station's environmental license provided a complete
defense to the argument that Macquarie Generation were willfully or negligently disposing of waste through
emissions of carbon dioxide. It is not clear, though whether this decision would be followed by other Australian
state courts.
141. In a "merits review" hearing the court re-exercises the powers of the original decision-maker, i.e., the
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planning and environmental assessment laws.14 2 These cases include challenges
to coal-fired power plants (both new facilities and the extension of existing
plants), coal mines, and development proposals that take insufficient account of
future climate change impacts (for example, as a result of sea level rise). There is
also a growing body of planning legal challenges to renewable energy projects,
such as wind farms, on the basis of their local environmental and amenity effects.
These projects have been defended by reference to the broader-scale benefits of
renewable energy as a climate change mitigation measure.14 3
While Australian climate change litigation is less prevalent than in the United
States, at around fifty decisions to date, these cases represent a significant body of
jurisprudence. The number of decided climate change cases in Australia outnumbers those in the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, Germany, and even the
European Union (where cases have been mostly concerned with enforcement of
the EU's emissions trading scheme).1 " Underpinning the growth of climate
change litigation in Australia is concern among the public and environmental
groups over the environmental effects of a booming coal mining industry,
coupled with opportunities for decision-making review and broad standing
provisions under many planning and environmental laws that have facilitated
challenges to development proposals. 145
C.

COMMONALITIES AND DIVERGENCES

The description in the preceding sections of the United States' and Australian
regulatory approaches, and the role of litigation within them, reveals core
commonalities and divergences. This section compares the two regulatory
approaches in order to ground the rest of the article's analysis of the role of
litigation in multi-dimensional climate change governance. It focuses in particular on the countries' emissions profiles and major corporate emitters; the
approach to developing climate change regulation and to litigation within their
legal systems; and the particular patterns of litigation that have emerged.
First, both countries are major developed country emitters, who have substantial total emissions and per capita emissions. While the United States has
substantially more total emissions and a more prominent geopolitical position on
climate change, Australia is a higher per capita emitter. Among OECD countries,
the United States has the greatest total emissions and Australia the second

court can reassess the factual basis and not just the legality of a decision given.
142. See, e.g., Planning and Environment Act 1987 (Vic); Development Act 1993 (SA); Environmental
Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW).
143. See e.g. TaralgaLandscape GuardiansInc. v. Ministerfor Planning [2007] 161 LGERA I (Austl.).
144. See COLUMBIA LAw SCHooL. NON-US CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION CHART, available at http://web.
law.columbia.edu/climate-change/resources/non-us-climate-change-litigation-chart.
145. Brian J. Preston, The Influence of Climate Change Litigationon Governments and the PrivateSector, 2
CLIMATE L. 485 (2011).
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greatest per capita emissions. 14 6 In both instances, the high level of emissions
results in large part from a heavy dependence on fossil fuels. The United States
and Australia produce and consume fossil fuels-particularly coal, gas, and
oil-at very high rates and litigation in those countries largely centers around
those sources of emissions. As a result, many lawsuits, even when focused on
government regulation, have included representatives of the fossil fuel industry,
and the nonprofit organizations they create, on the side of the case opposing
regulation. In the United States, the leading Supreme Court case, Massachusetts
v. EPA, represents just one instance among many of this phenomenon.' 4 7 Even
early state court cases in the United States, such as one in the 1990s in Minnesota
over a law that included carbon dioxide in an environmental cost valuation
scheme, tend to include these dynamics.1 4 8 The many cases in both countries over
coal-fired power plants further illustrate this phenomenon. 14 9
However, these similarities in overall patterns of litigation in the two countries
mask some nuanced differences within the fossil fuel industry that are reflected
in the details of the litigation dynamics. In both countries, the coal industry has
been particularly monolithic in its opposition to action on global warming. Its
relatively low profit margins, compared to other fossil fuels such as oil, and lack
of diversification mean that the coal industry has little to gain from regulation. In
Australia, the country's economic dependence on coal exports, coupled with the
view that the mining industry carried Australia safely through the global financial
crisis, has given the coal mining lobby significant influence with government
regulators.15 0 In contrast, the oil industry, which is much larger in the United
States than in Australia, has a more diverse interaction with climate change
regulation, which can be seen in the split in oil companies involved with
anti-regulatory lawsuits. Some major oil companies, rather than opposing regulation, have decided to try to influence the regulatory process so that their concerns
are taken into account and participate actively in collaborative efforts to address
climate change such as the United States Climate Action Partnership. '' Overall, though, many fossil fuel industry representatives in both countries oppose

146. Mark McCormick & Paul Scruton, World Carbon Dioxide Emissions Data by Country, supra note 50.
147. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535 (2007).
148. See In re Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d 794, 796-97 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). For a
discussion of the Minnesota case, see Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation, supra
note 26, at 1789-1855; Hari M. Osofsky, Local Approaches to Transnational Corporate Responsibility:
Mapping the Role of Sub-National Climate Change Litigation, 20 PAC. McGEORGE GLOBAL BUs. & DEv. L.J.,
143, 143-59(2007).
149. For a discussion of these cases, see supra Sections II.A.3 & II.B.4.
150. Guy PEARSE, HIGH AND DRY, supra note 99.

151. Simone Pulver, An Environmental ContestationApproach to Analysing the Causes and Consequences
of the Climate Change Policy Split in the Oil Industry, ORG. & ENV'T, no. 1, 2007 at 52-55; U.S. CLIMATE
ACTION P'SHIP, A CALL FOR AcTroN: CONSENSUS PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE U.S. CLIMATE

ACTION PARTNERSHIP: A BUSINESS AND NGO PARTNERSHIP (2007).
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action on climate change and participate actively on the anti-regulatory side in
litigation.
Second, both countries have democratic, federalist, common law legal systems
in which litigation plays an important role in shaping regulatory trajectories and
both initially opposed the Kyoto Protocol. This combination has allowed for
many different types of opportunities to use litigation as a mechanism for public
activism and opposition to government and business decision-making. As the
volume of litigation in both countries reflects, concerned nongovernmental
organizations and governmental officials have used litigation as a tool to push for
regulatory action that was failing to emerge from legislative and planning

processes.1 52
However, the more recent divergence in the two countries' regulatory paths
may have implications for the ongoing role of litigation in the two jurisdictions.
Australia joined the Kyoto Protocol in 2007 and passed comprehensive climate
change legislation setting a price for carbon in compliance with those obligations
(although this legislation may be short-lived). The United States has not wavered
in its refusal to join the Kyoto Protocol, appears unlikely to pass comprehensive
federal legislation, and currently only regulates GHG emissions under longstanding environmental law based on a decision by its highest federal court. This
difference, combined with a more litigious culture in the United States, has
translated, and likely will continue to translate, into litigation playing much more
of a role in establishing the foundational United States regulatory approach than
it will in Australia. It also helps to explain the greater presence of anti-regulatory
suits in the United States as Australia turns to more climate change adaptationoriented lawsuits. Even so, the Australian regulatory approach is likely to change;
the Abbott government has vowed to repeal the national carbon pricing legislation, and replace it with a widely-criticized "direct action plan that will pay
companies to reduce their emissions to below 'business as usual' levels.") 5 3
Litigation is likely to reemerge as a way of pressuring the government and
businesses to take action on climate change.
Finally, although the lawsuits reaching the United States Supreme Court
continue to be higher profile and play a significant regulatory role, it is important
to acknowledge a pattern in the litigation in both countries. Namely, by volume,
the vast majority of climate change litigation in both countries focuses on
individual coal mining or power projects. Because each case individually is
relatively small scale and narrow in scope, there is a danger of missing their
cumulative regulatory impact. But their frequency in both countries indicates the
potential for opposition to coal power, expressed through litigation, to play a
significant regulatory role over time.
152. ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 9.
153. Tony Abbott, Our Plan to Abolish the Carbon Tax, Liberal Party of Australia, available at http://
www.liberal.org.aulour-plan-abolish-carbon-tax.
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III. REGULATORY PATHWAYS THROUGH LITIGATION
The global proliferation of climate change litigation, particularly in the United
States and Australia, is an interesting phenomenon in and of itself. Yet at a
practical level, critical questions remain as to what role litigation can play in
moving towards a sustainable, clean energy future and whether such cases offer a
"potentially game-changing phenomenon" in the regulatory effort to tackle
climate change.' 5 4 Unless the effort is made to connect "the dots between climate
change litigation and responses by [regulatory] agencies and the legislature,"155
there is arguably little way of knowing whether climate change litigation is
effective as a strategy for reducing emissions and adapting to climate change.
However, tracing regulatory pathways generated through litigation is a complex analytical task as there is no widely agreed method for assessing the link
between regulatory development and a particular case.15 6 This part proposes a
framework for such an assessment, which will provide the basis for future
qualitative empirical work building upon this article. The part details our
conceptual mapping of possible regulatory pathways for litigation that are
consistent with the overall goal of instituting an economy-wide transition to clean
energy sources and facilitating climate change adaptation. We draw on United
States and Australian case law examples to illustrate those possibilities. In line
with the socio-legal tradition framed above and in this part, we regard regulatory
outcomes as "not [only] limited to targeted rules that are enforced and monitored,
nor . .. to state intervention in the economy and/or civil society," but also as
encompassing situations where climate change litigation "influenc[es] the flow of
events," by producing formal or direct legal change, or more indirectly through
changing the behavior of governmental, corporate and non-governmental actors. 157 We elucidate this concept of direct and indirect pathways against the
broader backdrop of the multi-dimensional climate change regulatory system
before turning to specific examples of forms of direct and indirect regulation that
might result from climate change litigation and the implications of our model for
regulating complex problems in the administrative state.

154. Markell & Ruhl, An Empirical Survey of Climate Change Litigationin the United States, supra note 48,
at 10644.
155. Markell & Ruhl, An EmpiricalAssessment of Climate Change in the Courts, supra note 36, at 83.
156. In the broader project we are undertaking, in which this article serves as a critical conceptual framing,
we are tackling this issue by employing a mixed method approach comprising: (1) detailed case study analysis;
and (2) qualitative evaluation of the extent to which climate change cases influence subsequent regulatory
outcomes. A critical component of evaluating the outcomes of cases is semi-structured interviews conducted in
the United States and Australia with environmental litigants, regulators, court officials, and business entities
(e.g., developers, emitters, and insurers) with the aim of eliciting detailed information about how climate change
cases in each jurisdiction have influenced behavior at an individual and institutional level.
157. CHRISTINE PARKER ET AL, INTRODUCTION, in REGULATING LAw (Christine Parker et al eds., Oxford
University Press 2004), at 1-2.
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A. VALUE OF PLURALIST AND POLYCENTRIC APPROACHES TO GOVERNANCE
The complex interrelationship between litigation and the actions taken by key
actors in the United States and Australia illustrate the cross-cutting nature of
climate change governance. Litigation serves as one piece among many in a
broader regulatory puzzle in both countries, and an explanation of regulation in
either would be incomplete without including litigation in the narrative. However, acknowledging the important role of litigation and these many relationships
does not resolve what one's model of governance would be.' 5 8 One could view
these cases as helping to comprise a country's regulatory approach in a top-down,
treaty-focused governance model.'
Or, alternatively, one could adopt a more
pluralist/polycentric approach in which various formal and informal activities at
multiple levels of government are all viewed as part of climate change gover-

nance.160
Under either approach, the regulatory pathways that we are mapping still help
to provide an explanation of what happens internally in nation-states.1 6 1 The
value of a pluralist and polycentric approach is that it allows for fuller exploration
of a regulatory role for litigation beyond how it contributes to a nation-state's
approach. Such an exploration allows for the possibility that litigation might not
simply help to comprise national approaches, but also might complement them.
This view potentially expands litigation's gap-filling role and imbues it with a
broader value. Thus litigation could serve not only to fill gaps in national policy
that allow for better participation in the international treaty regime, but also to fill
gaps that the treaty regime-even if more successful-might still leave. In addition, litigation across jurisdictions may, like agreements among sub-national governments that have no international legal regulatory significance, help to produce
important changes in norms and behavior regardless of the existence of gaps.' 6 2
This part focuses on the nexus between litigation and regulation in order to
construct such a fuller governance model. Exploring the many direct and indirect
ways in which litigation interacts with regulation assists a more systematic
understanding of its influence in establishing and altering approaches to mitigation and adaptation. Both pro-regulatory and anti-regulatory cases, through their
successes and failures, can help to reshape the regulatory landscape.163

158. In prior work, for example, Hari Osofsky has suggested a grouping of international legal theory into
strict Westphalian, modified Westphalian, pluralist, and critical. Strict Westphalians have a fully state-centric
view of the international law. Modified Westphalians still treat the nation-state as central, but view other actors
and interactions as important. Pluralists decenter the nation-state, and critical scholars question its legitimacy.
See Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change LitigationPartII, supra note 26, at 573-620.
159. A modified Westphalian would likely take this kind of approach. See id.
160. See sources cited supra note 17.
161. See Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change LitigationPart11, supra note 26.
162. Hari M. Osofsky, The Continuing Importanceof Climate Change Litigation,supra note 26, at 3-29.
163. Preston, Climate Change Litigation (Part1), supra note 8; Preston, Climate Change Litigation (Part2),
supra note 8.

242

THE GEORGETOWN INT'L ENVTL. LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:207

As noted above, we take a broad view of regulation and governance that
considers both the direct and indirect regulatory contribution of litigation. Many
cases in both countries attempt to force or limit government regulation or ask
courts to regulate corporate behavior. The resolution of these cases, whichever
side prevails, directly shapes regulation at federal or state levels. However, we
also treat the ways in which these cases impact public opinion or put pressure on
key actors as an important part of their regulatory influence."
In so doing, we are further developing prior models of climate change
litigation as direct and indirect regulation16 5 by dissecting both sets of pathways.
Below we explore the diversity of direct and indirect regulatory impacts in order
to provide a needed assessment of litigation's role in climate change governance.
The section that follows introduces this schema.
B.

DIRECT AND INDIRECT REGULATORY PATHWAYS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION

A close analysis of the existing case law and literature on climate change
litigation suggests a variety of possible regulatory pathways, illustrated in Figure 1. We have divided pathways into direct and indirect categories, although we
recognize that a firm dividing line does not always exist between the categories.
Some of the pathways identified are already well-trodden in the case law; some
are emerging; and yet others are indications of where future case law may arise.
In the following sections, we provide a brief description of each pathway and
relevant case examples drawn from the U.S. and Australian litigation experience.
These cases include both ones pushing for greater regulation and those opposing
regulatory steps.
1. Direct Regulation
In legal systems that maintain adherence to the notion of separation of powers,
pathways for courts to act as direct regulators through the mechanism of climate
change litigation are, unsurprisingly, rather limited. Nonetheless, even within the
framework of a limited judicial power there are possibilities for litigation to give
rise to direct pathways for climate change regulation.
Constitutional interpretation:One such avenue relies on constitutional rights
to life or to a healthy environment. Such rights could serve as a basis for affected
citizens to challenge government action responsible for contributing to climate
change and its effects.' 6 However, to date, neither jurisdiction has had constitu-

164. For an analysis of the direct and indirect regulatory roles of litigation, see Hari M. Osofsky, The
ContinuingImportance of Climate ChangeLitigation, supra note 26, at 3-29.
165. See id.
166. Preston, Climate Change Litigation (Part 2), supra note 8. Human rights claims have already been
taken at the international level. E.g., Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking
Relief from Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States
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1: Conceptual mapping of regulatory pathways for climate change litigation

tionally-based climate change cases. The respective federal Constitutions of
Australia and the United States-while conferring judicial review authority on
the High Court and Supreme Court respectively to invalidate legislation or
executive actions that are judged unconstitutional-do not contain broadlyframed right to life or environment provisions (as exist in some other national
constitutions). The U.S. Constitution's Fifth Amendment regulatory takings
jurisprudence conceivably could apply to regulation relating to climate change,
but there has not been such a case to date.' 6 7 More scope for constitutional rights'
claims may lie at the State constitutional level in the United States, given the
existence of formally entrenched provisions providing protection to environmental and natural resources in some State constitutions.168 As Markell and Ruhi

(Dec. 7, 2005). For discussion of a possible human rights climate change claim by Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islanders in Australia see Owen Cordes-Holland, The Sinking of the Strait: The Implications of Climate Change
for Torres Strait Islanders'HumanRights Protectedby the ICCPR 9(2) MELBOURNE J. INTL L., 40 (2009).
167. For a discussion of takings and climate change, see J. Peter Byrne, Rising Seas and Common Law
Baselines:A Comment on Regulatory Takings Discourseon Climate Change, 11 VT. J. ENvTL. L. 625 (2010); A.
Dan Tarlock, Takings, Water Rights, and Climate Change, 36 VT. L. REv. 731 (2012).
168. E.g. MONT. CONsT. art. XI, § 1.
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note, if constitutional/civil rights cases were to emerge they might offer courts the
opportunity "to forge a special jurisprudence for climate change." 69
Statutory interpretation: A promising avenue for courts to create direct
regulatory pathways as a result of climate change litigation arises from cases that
target issues of statutory interpretation. In both Australia and the United States,
the focus of such cases has been on re-interpretation of long-standing pollution
control and environmental statutes in order to encompass newer climate change
concerns. These cases have addressed both substantive and procedural provisions.
Substantive Statutory Interpretation:A significant number of statutory interpretation climate cases in the United States pursue what Markell and Ruhl term a
"substantive mitigation regulation" claim.o7 0 These actions seek to "require a
legislature or agency to promulgate a statute, rule, or policy establishing new or
more stringent limits on GHG emissions by regulating direct or indirect
sources.""' Where successful, the result of such cases is to establish a mandate
for the legislature or executive branch agencies to undertake climate change
regulation.17 2 The most prominent example of this kind of regulatory pathway for
climate change litigation is the mandate established via the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the federal Clean Air Act in Massachusetts v. EPA' 7 3 for the EPA
to introduce regulations limiting GHG emissions from new motor vehicles. The
EPA has since engaged in a number of rulemaking exercises in response to this
decision, including the issue of an "endangerment finding" in respect of the
public health impacts of motor vehicle GHG emissions, establishment of GHG
emissions standards for light and heavy-duty vehicles, and creation of limits on
emissions from stationary sources.' 7 4 As discussed above,17 5 these regulations
make up the bulk of climate change law at the federal level in the United States
and have put the nation firmly on a path of administrative regulation of emissions
levels, rather than adopting a market-based approach as was originally favored by
the Obama administration.
Less ostensibly successful but arguably still influential have been a series of
cases in the United States testing whether GHG emissions are a pollutant "subject

169. Markell & Ruhl, An EmpiricalAssessment of Climate Change in the Courts, supra note 36, at 85.
170. Id. at 15-86.
171. Id. at 33.
172. In Australia there is not the same tradition as in the United States, of independent executive agencies
operating under legislative mandates since, by and large, laws are administered by government departments that
are beholden to government Ministers (members of the executive) and through them to the legislature. Where
independent executive agencies have been established in the climate change field, as in the case of the Climate
Change Authority, their role is generally limited to one of advising responsible Ministers (although from a
political standpoint such advice may be difficult to ignore).
173. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
174. Markell & Ruhl, An EmpiricalAssessment of Climate Change in the Courts, supra note 36, at 15-86;
Hari M. Osofsky, DiagonalFederalismand Climate Change,supra note 26.
175. See section II.A supra.
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to regulation" under programs of the Clean Air Act requiring implementation of
"Best Available Control Technology" (BACT) requirements.' 7 6 While these
claims were not upheld by the courts, they prompted the EPA to clarify the
question of the correct interpretation of "subject to regulation," an issue the
agency's Environmental Appeals Board had identified as being of "national
scope." 7 7
When statutory authority and accompanying rules already exist, this litigation
pathway also includes agencies using their legislatively-based mandates in
courts. For example, the Australian carbon pricing legislation seemed to be
leading to the emergence of a new kind of litigation there concerned with
maintenance of the statutory regime. The Chair of the Clean Energy Regulator
(the agency which administers the scheme) indicated her intention to pursue
rigorous enforcement action against liable entities that failed to discharge
requirements under the legislation to buy emissions permits to cover their
greenhouse pollution.178
In addition, the federal competition regulator, the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission, was swift to take action pursuant to its statutory mandate
against companies making false claims about increases in the prices of goods and
services due to the carbon tax. The ACCC released a fact sheet about "carbon
price claims" and its role in preventing misleading and deceptive conduct in this
area. In August 2012, the ACCC issued its first fine to a business found to have
made a false claim about the impact of the carbon tax.'7 9 Of course, if the Clean
Energy Act is repealed then these avenues will no longer continue to be pursued.
Although the bulk of cases in both countries focus on reducing emissions, an
emerging set of cases focus on adaptation concerns. These cases may assist in
176. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1990). For a list of these requirements, see Markell & Ruhl, An
EmpiricalAssessment of Climate Change in the Courts, supra note 36, at 42, n.60.
177. In re Deseret Power Elec. Coop., PSD Appeal No. 07-03, 2008 WL 5572891 (2008).
178. David Wroe, Carbon Cop to Pull out All Stops, THE AGE (Melbourne), July 2, 2012, http://
www.theage.com.au/opinion/political-news/carbon-cop-to-pull-out-all-stops-20120701-2 1b58.htm (quoting the
Chair of the Clean Energy Regulator as saying that "If it really appears that [liable entities] are not reporting
accurately, then we have information-gathering powers like any other regulator and we will exercise those. If
necessary we would go to court.")
179. See ACCC, CarbonPrice Claims,http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/political-news/carbon-cop-to-pullout-all-stops-20120701-2lb58.html; Judith Ireland, Gym fined for pumping up carbon claims, The Age
(Melbourne), August 1 2012, online at http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/political-news/gym-fined-for-pumpingup-carbon-tax-claims-20120801-23eb7.html. The actions by the ACCC add to other competition law-related
litigation the agency has brought in the past against companies falsely advertising the green/carbon benefits of
their products. A prominent example is the case of ACCC v GM Holden Ltd [2008] FCA 1428. The ACCC
alleged misleading and deceptive conduct in respect of Saab's "Grrrrrreen" advertising campaign, which
claimed: "Every Saab is green. With carbon emissions neutral across the entire Saab range. Saab will plant 17
native trees on your behalf in the first year as a carbon offset." As a result of the legal action, GM Holden-the
owner of Saab in Australia-accepted a court-enforceable undertaking not to republish its original advertisements in the future, and to train its marketing staff in relation to misleading and deceptive green marketing
claims. In addition, GM Holden advised ACCC that it would plant 12,500 native trees to offset the carbon
emissions for the life of all Saab cars sold during the advertising campaign.
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creating linkages in regulation and the public consciousness between mitigation
and adaptation. In this category are a series of cases in the United States under the
federal Endangered Species Act 80 seeking the listing of particular species on the
basis of the species being threatened by the effects of climate change.' As
Markell and Ruhl note, the same logic could be applied to other conservation
statutes in an effort to impose duties on agencies to identify various climate
change-threatened natural resources, with significant benefits for overall climate
change adaptation.1 8 2 However, arguably these cases are not solely about
adaptation. The Endangered Species Act's stringent requirements around listed
species may also trigger mitigation obligations to limit the impacts on those
species. 183
Beyond this more-developed Endangered Species Act and climate change
jurisprudence, the United States appears to be moving in the direction of more
direct adaptation suits in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy. A recent petition to
the New York Public Service Commission asked it to require all the utilities it
regulates to develop and implement plans to adapt to anticipated climate change,
with a specific focus on hazard mitigation and disaster response.184
A more stringent adaptation approach with implications for mitigation policy
may also be the outcome of some Australian climate change cases such as
ongoing litigation in Victoria against energy companies in respect of damage
caused in the devastating "Black Saturday" bushfires.'18 Several power companies and a company responsible for checking electricity lines were joined as
tortfeasors in a class action with the State of Victoria. This joinder highlights the
potential liability of companies that provide electricity infrastructure in situations
of accelerating bushfire risk under climate change, 18 6 and could lay the foundations for more comprehensive adaptation measures in the future while also
highlighting the need for emissions limitations as a preventative response.
In the Australian coastal adaptation-planning sphere, the case of Walker v.
Minister for Planning'8 7 decided by the New South Wales (NSW) Land and

180. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1973).
181. E.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Dep't of Interior, 563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
182. Markell & Ruhl, An EmpiricalAssessment of Climate Change in the Courts, supra note 36, at 15-86.
183. ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 9.

184. Petition to the New York PublicService Commission on Natural HazardPlanning, (submitted Dec. 12,
2012).
185. Matthews v. SPI Electricity Pty. Ltd.; SPI Electricity Pty. Ltd. v. Util. Serv. Corp. (Ruling No 2) [2011]
VSC 168 (Austl.). The trial is in January 2013. For the latest hearings, see Matthews v. SPI Electricity and SPI
Electricity Pty Ltd v. Utility Services Corporation Ltd (Ruling No 5) [2012] VSC 66; Matthews v. SPI
Electricity and SPI Electricity Pty Ltd v. Utility Services Corporation Ltd (Ruling No 5) [2012] VSC 66,
http://www.
scvcases.com.au/MyPDF%20Library/%5B2012%5D%20VSC%2066.pdf.
186. Leanne Mezrani, Bushfires Spark Liability Debate, LAWYERS WEEKLY (AUSTRALIA) January 8, 2013,

http://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/news/bushfires-spark-liability-debate.
187. Walker v. Ministerfor Planning [2007] 157 LGERA 124 (Austl.).
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Environment Court serves as another example of the statutory interpretation
pathway. In this case the Court determined that a legislative requirement under
the state environmental planning and assessment statute relating to consideration
of the "public interest" allowed reference to "principles of ecologically sustainable development" included in the Act's objects, and, via those principles, to
future climate change impacts.'18 Subsequent to the Walker case, the NSW
government amended the Standard Instrument Local Environmental Plan to
insert a new clause regarding development within the coastal zone and the need
to accommodate climate change. This was followed in 2009 by the issue of a
NSW government sea level rise policy instituting new benchmarks for sea-level
rise planning. 8 9
ProceduralStatutory Interpretation: The bulk of climate change cases that
have been brought or are being litigated in United States' and Australian courts do
not seek a direct reduction in GHG emissions or the implementation of specific
adaptation measures. Rather, their goal is to ensure that GHG emissions and
climate change impacts are routinely taken into account and adequately evaluated
in planning and environmental assessment processes under long-standing state
and federal environmental laws. In the United States, a suite of such cases have
been launched under the national environmental impact assessment legislationthe National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)' 90-along with State equivalents
such as the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).1 91 In Australia,
seminal cases in this tradition include the case of Australian Conservation
Foundation v. Latrobe City Council (Hazelwood case)' 9 2-holding that a planning amendment necessary to enable expansion of one of Victoria's largest
coal-fired power stations should consider the "indirect" effects of the amendment
in terms of its climate change consequences, and the decision in Gray v. Minister
for Planning (Anvil Hill case) 19 3 -finding that indirect greenhouse gas emissions
resulting from the burning of extracted coal were a relevant factor in the
environmental assessment of a NSW coal mine. Cumulatively, these cases have
firmly established the relevance of GHG emissions/climate change issues to
environmental assessment exercises conducted for a range of development

188. Id. at 189, 191-192. The Walker case was overturned on appeal but the judgment of the NSW Court of
Appeal nonetheless stressed that it would be an exceptional case where the public interest did not require
reference to principles of ecologically sustainable development and that such matters would need to be included
at approval stage: see Ministerfor Planning v Walker [2008] 161 LGERA 423 (Austl.) at 454.
189. A change in government in NSW has seen the repeal of this policy leaving decisions about sea level rise
planning to local government authorities. Coastal Management and Adapting to Sea Level Rise (N.S.W.
Planning and Infrastructure) http://www.planning.nsw.gov.au/adapting-to-sea-level-rise (Austl.)
190. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §4321 (1969); e.g. Border Power Plant Working Grp. v.
Dep't of Energy, 260 F Supp. 2d 997 (S.D. Cal. 2003).
191. California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21000 (1970).; e.g. Communities for a
Better Env't v. Richmond, 108 Cal Rptr. 3d 478 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
192. AustralianConservation Found.v. Latrobe City Council [20041140 LGERA 100 (Austl.).
193. Gray v. Ministerfor Planning [2006] 152 LGERA 258 (Austl.).

248

THE GEORGETOWN INT'L ENVTL. LAW REVIEw

[Vol. 25:207

projects.
Some cases have also had specific regulatory flow-on effects. For example,
following the Anvil Hill case, the NSW government released a new State
Environmental Planning Policy for mining activities requiring the inclusion of
indirect emissions in environmental assessments. Similarly, as a result of the the
Hazelwood decision, the Victorian government concluded a Greenhouse Gas
Reduction Deed with the owner of the Hazelwood power station requiring an
offset of a portion of the power station's emissions.194 More broadly, cases
requiring assessment of GHG emissions/climate change impacts as part of new
development proposals may generate changes in business risk management
practices whereby the disclosure of such information becomes routine and/or
efforts are made to offset impacts in project design in order to minimize the
likelihood of litigation. They also, as described above, may increase the cost of
doing business for coal companies.
Common law reinterpretation: Substantial commentary on climate change
litigation, particularly in the United States, has focused on this potential avenue
of court-led regulatory change. However, none of the U.S. cases seeking to
extend common law causes of action to climate change harms has yet to be
adjudicated on the merits, and many have not proceeded that far. In Australia, all
of the litigation to date has been statutorily-based despite the nation's common
law tradition. But commentators have explored the possibility of common law
suits on public nuisance and negligence grounds and so this pathway is worth
analyzing in that context as well.' 95 For example, commentators have considered
whether decisions or policies of Australian local governments and other corporate entities that take insufficient account of climate change impacts and thus lead
to damage to private property and public infrastructure could give rise to future
liability on these grounds. 19 6
In the United States, the Supreme Court's decision in AEP v. Connecticut
precludes success on a common law federal nuisance theory so long as the U.S.
EPA retains its regulatory authority.19 7 The Court's reluctance to resolve the issue
of non-governmental standing regarding climate change, often relevant in nuisance actions, is currently resulting in splits among lower courts over the issue.'9

194. Preston, The Influence of Climate Change Litigation on Governments and the Private Sector, supra
note 144, at 493.
195. NicoLA DURRAT, LEGAL RESPONSES 1O CLIMATE CHANGE 269-88 (2010); Brian Preston, Climate
Change Litigation (Part1), supra note 8, at 3.
196. Baker and McKenzie, Local Council Risk of Liability in the Face of Climate Change-Resolving
Uncertainties, A Report for the Australian Local Government Association, 22 July 2011; Jan McDonald, A Risky
Climate for Decision-Making: The Liability of Development Authoritiesfor Climate Change Impacts, 24(6)
ENvT.. & PLAN. L.J. 405; DURRANT, LEGAL RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 192, at 289-306.
197. Hari M. Osofsky, Litigation's Role in the Path of U.S. Federal Climate Change Regulation, supra
note 25.
198. Id.
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If one of the still-pending cases-such as the case of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil
Corp.,199 currently before the San Francisco-based Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals-was to be successful, it could create significant regulatory momentum
in the United States and internationally by exposing large emitters to liability for
damages caused by climate change to which their emissions contributed. However, such cases face many hurdles regarding proof of causation and contribution
even if they establish standing and successfully address the preemption question
that AEP v. Connecticut left open for the state law nuisance claims.
In addition, Oregon-based non-profit organization Our Children's Trust filed
lawsuits against all fifty U.S. states and a number of federal government agencies
under the public trust doctrine in May 2011.20 The public trust doctrine treats
certain natural resources as owned by the government, which has trust obligations to the public to maintain them for public use and benefit. It varies from state
to state, based on their common law traditions, and in some states is also viewed
as part of their constitutional or statutory law. These lawsuits claimed that
governmental entities were violating their public trust duties by failing to
adequately protect the atmosphere through their approach to climate change.
Although a number of these lawsuits have already been dismissed, state courts in
both Texas and New Mexico held in 2012 that public trust protections could
extend to the atmosphere. 20 1The ultimate resolution of these and other cases will
become clearer as they continue through the court system.
2. Indirect Regulation
Achieving regulatory change as a result of climate change litigation often may
come not through direct pathways, where cases generate clear legal reforms (and
potential resistance through anti-regulatory climate change suits). Rather, litigation may have its most significant impacts through indirect pathways that harness
the activities of non-state actors, such as not-for-profit environmental groups and
other community actors, corporate actors, including insurers and financiers, and
the legal profession. Pathways that mobilize such actors are also likely to be an
important factor in producing the cultural and behavioral shift necessary for
realization of a sustainable, clean energy future over the longer-term. Indeed, to
the extent that climate change litigation can tie into the broader corporate social

199. Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corp., et al, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
200. For a listing of these cases, see GERRARD ET AL, U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE LYTIGATION CHART, supra note 79.

201. Bonser-Lain v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (Dist. Ct. of Travis Cty, Tx, Aug. 2, 2012)
(holding that the public trust doctrine applies but that the petition is denied on the basis that defendant is
exercising reasonable rulemaking discretion in light of pending litigation); Sanders-Reed v. Martinez (N.M.
Dist. Ct., July 14, 2012) (N.M. Dist. Ct., filed March 2012) (granting in part and denying in part motion to
dismiss); For a discussion of these cases, see Alexandra Klass, Federalism at Work: Recent Developments in
Public Trust Lawsuits to Limit Greenhouse Gas Emissions, CPRBlog, July 13, 2012, http://www.progressive
reform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog= 8092FA68-ADF9-7258-98BF80BAC5FA4AA7.
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responsibility movement, including sustainability indices and global reporting
networks, this may prove a particularly effective route for achieving change.
Below we survey several potential indirect regulatory pathways that are evident
in the case law record to date.
Prod and plea: Reflecting the limitations of a separation of powers system,
courts are often reluctant to rule on climate change issues where they see these as
straying into the policy domain of the legislative and executive branches. This
restraint is most clearly expressed in the United States through the political
question doctrine, which prevents courts deciding non-justiciable political questions, although it appears that doctrine will play a relatively limited role in
restraining climate change litigation directly. In the public nuisance context, after
lower courts disputed the applicability of the doctrine, a plurality of the United
States Supreme Court held in AEP v. Connecticut that no threshold barriers
(including political question) prevented the dispute. This ruling will likely
constrain political question as a significant argument in future U.S. cases.
Arguably, however, the Supreme Court's focus in that case on the way in which
the EPA's regulatory authority displaces the common law public nuisance
pathway reflects a similar impulse to keep climate change regulation on a
statutorily based track.202
Nonetheless, where courts feel they have reached the boundary of their official
role in a given climate change case, their decisions may still serve as a direct
regulatory pathway through the exercise of what Ewing and Kysar have dubbed a
"prod and plea" function.2 03 Accordingly, "[e]ven when a social need exceeds the
scope of capacity of a government actor's role, she may still acknowledge the
seriousness of that need and the desirability of action by more appropriate
actors."2 04 In the United States, Markell and Ruhl cite the case of Re Otter Tail
Power Company205 as an example of a court exercising this function. 2 0 6 In that
case, the South Dakota Supreme Court refused to overturn a decision of the
Public Utility Commission to issue a power plant permit but commented in its
judgment on the "momentous and complex threat to our planet" presented by
global warming, the difficulty of resolving such complex issues in judicial
proceedings, and the need for policy decisions to be taken by the state executive
and legislative branches on the question.2 07

202. Hari M. Osofsky, Litigation's Role in the Path of U.S. Federal Climate Change Regulation, supra
note 25.
203. Benjamin Ewing & Douglas Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of Unlimited
Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 350-424 (2011).
204. Id. at 354.
205. 744 N.W.2d 594 (S.D. 2008).
206. Markell & Ruhl, An EmpiricalAssessment of Climate Change in the Courts, supra note 36, at 15-86.
207. In re Otter Tail Power Co., 744 N.W.2d 594, 603 (S.D. 2008).
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In Australia, courts have been less reticent than their U.S. counterparts to
"prod" lax governments into climate change regulatory action. A good example is
the case of Gippsland Coastal Board v. South Gippsland Shire Council20 8 that
determined that a precautionary approach was required with respect to approving
coastal development in the State of Victoria in light of future climate change
threats such as sea level rise. The Gippsland CoastalBoard case, together with
subsequent Victorian decisions such as the case of Taip v. East Gippsland Shire
Council,209 advocating proactive adaptation measures notwithstanding the absence or evolving nature of state coastal planning policy frameworks, have been
closely followed by Victorian government efforts to develop policy measures and
decision-making guidelines for coastal climate change adaptation. 21 0
Changing norms and values: Climate change cases in this category are those
where the cases result in changes in norms and values surrounding climate
change. These changes may arise, for example, as a result of the desire of a
corporate actor to avoid (further) reputational damage or because of the publicity
for climate change impacts generated by a case. A good example of the former
from the Australian context is the case of Drake-Brockman v. Minister for
21 1
Planning,
which involved a challenge to the approval for redevelopment of a
large and prominent site in central Sydney. The developer won the case.
However, in the course of the litigation expert evidence disclosed the significant
carbon footprint of the proposed development as a proportion of the total GHG
emissions from the City of Sydney local government area. Subsequently, the site
was sold to a new developer who committed to address sustainability issues,
including GHG emissions. A new concept plan for the development was submitted, including measures for GHG emissions' reduction and a target of 100%
carbon neutrality in the operational phase.2 12
The case of Wildlife Preservation.Society of Queensland Proserpinev. Minister for the Environment and Heritage2 1 3 was another "ostensibly unsuccessful"
Australian case, which still had some subsequent regulatory impact. 2 14 The case
challenged the federal approval issued for two new coal mines on the basis that
emissions from burning the coal harvested would contribute to global warming,
endangering the World Heritage-listed Great Barrier Reef area. The complain-

208. Gippsland CoastalBd. v. South GippslandShire Council [2008] VCAT 1545 (Austl.).
209. Taip v. East GippslandShire Council [2010] 177 LGERA 236 (Austl.).
210. E.g. Rachael Webb & Elisa de Wit, Planningfor Coastal Climate Change in Victoria, ENVTL. & PLAN.
L.J., no. 27, 2011 at 23-35.
211. Drake-Brockman v. Ministerfor Planning[2007] 158 LGERA 349 (Austl.).
212. Preston, The Influence of Climate Change Litigation on Governments and the Private Sector, supra
note 144.
213. Wildlife PreservationSoc'y of QueenslandProserpinev. Ministerfor the Env't & Heritage [2006] 232
ALR 510 (Austl.).
214. Preston, The Influence of Climate Change Litigation on Governments and the Private Sector, supra
note 144 at 488.
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ant's claim-although dismissed by the Federal Court-served to highlight the
narrow scope of the federal environmental legislation to deal with climate change
impacts. 215 This concern was picked up in a subsequent independent review of
the legislation that recommended reforms to the Act to address climate change
issues.2 16 Although the recommendations were not implemented, the government
subsequently enacted amendments to the legislation that require environmental
assessment of "large coal mining developments with significant impacts on water
resources." 2 17
In the U.S. context, the petition by the Inuit to the Inter-American Commission
explicitly attempted to serve an expressivist purpose. Then-chair of the Inuit
Circumpolar Conference Sheila Watt-Cloutier acknowledged how unlikely formal success was and discussed the case as a basis for starting a human rights
dialogue over climate change with the United States.2 18 The nuisance cases
arguably serve a similar role. Even though they have yet to succeed formally,
their characterization of climate change as a public nuisance potentially influences how GHG emissions are viewed.
Climate change litigation also can serve as a mechanism for empowering
non-state actors beyond the corporate sector in ways that may enhance the
potential for positive behavioral change. A result of litigation may be, for
example, the opening up of pathways for citizens and other community actors to
challenge the energy choices of major corporations by reducing conventional
hurdles to public interest litigation such as standing, costs, or justiciability
barriers. In NSW, the case of Kennedy v. NSW Ministerfor Planning2 19 presaged
this kind of change by endorsing climate change litigation brought in the Walker
case as "public interest" litigation, with implications for the application of costs
rules. 220
Another, less obvious, agent for cultural change in the climate change
regulatory space is the legal profession. This group, through the advice they
provide to commercial clients, coupled with their generally risk averse attitude,

215. Jacqueline Peel & Lee Godden, The Environment Protectionand Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999
(Cth): Dark Sides of Virtue, 31 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 106, 106-45 (2007).
216. ALLAN HAWKE ET AL., THE AUSTRALIAN ENVIRONMENT Acr-REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE

ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION Acr 1999 (2009).

217. EPBC Amendment-Water Trigger 2013 (Cth. Dep't. of the Env't.) http://www.environment.gov/aul
epbc/about/water-trigger.html (Austl.).
218. Hari M. Osofsky, The Continuing Importance of Climate Change Litigation, supra note 26, at 3-29;
Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from
Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States (Dec. 7, 2005).
219. Kennedy v NSW Minister for Planning [2010] NSWLEC 164.
220. Kennedy v NSW Minister for Planning [2010] NSWLEC 164, para. 10. The usual costs rule applied by
Australian courts is that costs follow the event i.e. that the losing party is to pay the winning party's costs.
However, under Rule 4.21 of the Land and Environment Court Rules 2007, the NSW Land and Environment
Court "may decide not to make an order for the payment of costs against an unsuccessful applicant in any
proceedings if it is satisfied the proceedings have been brought in the public interest." Id.
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can also play an important role in shaping the behavioral response to climate

change litigation by other actors. Client briefings sent out by major Australian
law firms following the Wildlife Whitsunday case provide an example: these
briefings generally urged adoption of a "prudent course" whereby clients disclose
the GHG emissions of future projects and the steps taken to reduce emissions as a
way of lessening the potential for litigation and preventing costly delays.22 '
Similarly, in the United States, corporate and public interest law firms and
environmental NGOs increasingly include climate change in their counseling and
litigation portfolios.22 2
Increasingcosts: Climate change cases can also give rise to indirect regulatory
pathways by increasing the cost of emitting GHGs for large corporate emitters. In
both countries, the large volume of cases over coal-fired power plants may make
each project a little more expensive, with an aggregate economic influence. One
way in which this can occur is through courts imposing conditions on permits or
licenses for emitting activities. For example, in the Australian case of Hunter
Environmental Lobby Inc v. Minister for Planning223 the NSW Land and
Environment Court-for the first time in Australia-indicated that it would
impose conditions on a mine expansion approval to require the mine to offset its
scope 1 (i.e. its direct) emissions.22 4 More recently, in the State of Victoria, a
challenge by non-governmental environmental organizations to a new "Dual
Gas" coal-fired power station225 resulted in the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal attaching a condition to the approval of the power station providing
that the power station had to replace or displace existing brown coal capacity in
the state thereby demonstrating a net reduction in overall GHG emissions from
electricity generation in the state.2 26 In effect, this condition has made it harder
for the project to secure financial backing, resulting in a decision by the federal
Australian government to withdraw its own $100 million grant to the proposal
and casting doubt over the continued viability of the new power station.
The threat of litigation over the climate change impacts of emitting activities
221. E.g. PHILIP MURRAY & SIMON BATTEN, ALLENS ARTHUR, ROBINSON, GREENHOUSE GAS CHALLENGE 'ID
COAL MINES REJECTED BY FEDERAL COURT, Focus: ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING (2006).

222. See, e.g., Van Ness Feldman, Climate Change Counselors, http://www.vnf.com/professionals-connect16.html; Jones Day, Climate Change, http://www.jonesday.com/climate-change/.
223. Hunter Entl. Lobby Inc. v. Ulan Mines [2011] NSWLEC 221 (Austl.).
224. In a judgment handed down on 13 March 2012, Hunter EnvironmentLobby Inc v. Ministerfor Planning
(No 2) [2012] NSWLEC 40, the Court ultimately declined to impose the GHG condition because it found that
the Clean Energy Act 2011 and related legislation would cover most of the mine's activities which result in
scope I emissions and therefore the purpose of the condition would be met by the legislation. The Court also
found that the extent to which the Clean Energy Act 2011 would not cover all of the mine's scope 1 emissions
was negligible and therefore the proposed condition was unnecessary. Finally, the Court found that there is an
unsatisfactory level of uncertainty in relation to the offsets market sought to be utilised under the condition.
225. The proposal involved integrated drying and gasification of brown coal, which is then used in
conjunction with natural gas to fire combined cycle gas turbines for power generation. This process has a lower
greenhouse gas intensity than conventional brown coal-fired power.
226. Dual Gas Pty Ltd & Ors v Environment Protection Authority [2012] VCAT 308.
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may also impose additional costs on such activities through the necessity to
obtain liability insurance and the potential for rising insurance premiums. In a
closely watched case in the United States-AES v. Steadfast 2 7-the Virginia
Supreme Court ruled on September 16, 2011 that Steadfast Insurance did not
have a duty to defend AES Corp, a utility which is a defendant in the Kivalina
case. While the implications of this case for the liability of the insurance industry
in relation to climate change harms are not yet clear,22 8 it nonetheless demonstrates the dynamic relationship between climate change litigation, the obligations of major emitters, and the liability of insurers that have significant potential
to shape the emerging regulatory landscape.
C.

IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATING COMPLEX PROBLEMS IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

The direct and indirect regulatory pathways of the previous section provide the
basis for a better understanding of the nuances of climate change litigation's
regulatory role. They reveal varying patterns of influence in the two jurisdictions,
which helps add texture to Part H's comparison of climate change governance in
the United States and Australia. This section focuses on these patterns and their
implications for the regulation of complex problems in the administrative state.
First, a comparison of the approaches to litigation and their regulatory impacts
in the two countries helps to clarify the interaction between legislation and
litigation. Both governmental and nongovernmental actors use litigation to fill
perceived gaps in the regulatory system by changing the way in which existing
legislation is used. The gap-filling mostly takes place through the statutory
mandate and interpretation pathways, but the particular usage has evolved as
Australia's legislative path has diverged.
In the early stages, the United States and Australia were quite similar in their
overall regulatory posture. Neither had dedicated climate change legislation,
resulting in litigation that was a reaction to that gap and which sought ways to fill
it. The emphasis on statutory mandates and interpretation in both countries
during that period, supplemented by prod and plea and indirect measures, reflects
this role for litigation. In the United States, this pattern has persisted as the
prospects for comprehensive climate change ligation remain dim; statutory
mandates and interpretation have led to the federal regulatory system in place and
are actively shaping its scope. Other regulatory pathways continue to complement these primary ones as proactive and anti-regulatory suits are filed in a
variety of substantive areas.
In Australia, however, with the enactment of the Clean Energy legislation,

227. AES Corp. v. Steadfast, Va. S. Ct. No. 100764 (2011).
228. On January 17, 2012, the Virginia Supreme Court took the unusual step of setting aside its original
decision and granting a petition for rehearing of the case.
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litigation concentrated on filling gaps outside of the new statutory regime and
showed some signs of gravitating towards enforcement of the new legislation. As
discussed above under the statutory mandates pathway, the independent agency
administering the Clean Energy legislation announced its interest in using the
enforcement mechanisms of the new statutory regime.2 29 Other lawsuits have
targeted the offshore emissions of coal mining that fall outside the scope of the
Australian carbon pricing mechanism (which only covers domestic emissions).23 0 If the Clean Energy legislation is repealed we would expect the U.S.
and Australian litigation paths to converge once more.
These lawsuits are largely statutory interpretation cases, which try to apply
general environmental laws to limit non-covered emissions, or procedurallyoriented ones, which seek to ensure environmental assessment requirements
extend to offshore emissions. At the state level in Australia, claimants have also
sought to test the utility of dedicated climate change legislation in resisting
greenhouse intensive projects, such as new coal-fired power stations. In the Dual
Gas case, discussed above in the context of indirect economic impacts, the
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal agreed with the claimants that the
emissions reduction target in place at that time under the Victorian Climate
Change Act 2010231 was a relevant-albeit not decisive-measure to consider in
assessing the compliance of the project with general environmental law requirements.23 2
These evolving approaches to regulatory gap filling, with an emphasis on
statutory mandates and interpretation, indicate a close, iterative relationship
between climate change litigation and the existing and emergent regulatory
system. The patterns suggest that any model for how the legislative and executive
branches at multiple levels should coordinate to address complex problems in the
administrative state needs to take into account how litigation might interact with
these governance efforts. In particular, the experiences of both countries suggest
that the mandating and interpretation pathways often result in changes to
presumed statutory underpinnings and barriers.
Second, an application of these pathways to the two jurisdictions reveals
important commonalities and differences in not only the substantive focus of the

229. See supra notes 158-159.
230. See, for example, the case of Xstrata Coal Queensland Pty Ltd & Ors v Friends of the Earth-Brisbane
Co-op & Ors, and Department ofEnvironment and Resource Management [2012] QLC 013, heard and decided
during a period when clean energy legislation was being debated in the federal parliament. A particular concern
of the Friends of the Earth regarding the proposed Wandoan mine (the largest in the Southern hemisphere) was
the extent of the mine's "scope 3" (i.e., indirect, offshore) emissions.
231. Climate Change Act 2010 (Victoria). Following a review of the legislation, the Victorian government
repealed the target set in the legislation, which had called for a twenty percent reduction in greenhouse gases
below 2000 levels in Victoria by 2020.
232. Dual Gas Ply Ltd & Ors v Environment Protection Authority [2012] VCAT 308 (Austl) at paragraphs
228-240.
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litigation, but also the regulatory role that it plays. Particular types of litigation
emerge in one jurisdiction but not another, which influences the contours of a
regulatory pathway. For example, in both the United States and Australia there is
an increasing focus on the adaptation aspects of the climate change problem.2 33
However, the way in which litigation has interacted with these adaptation efforts
varies significantly in the two jurisdictions. Australia has lawsuits and case law
directly mentioning adaptation,2 34 whereas U.S. cases are just beginning to focus
directly on adaptation beyond the Endangered Species Act context. 2 3 5 Similarly,
tort lawsuits have played a relatively limited direct role thus far in the United
States because of the court opinions constraining them, but have served indirectly
to put expressive, economic, and cultural pressure on major emitters. In Australia, lawsuits have focused entirely on statutes rather than drawing from its
common law traditions, in part because torts suits are less used in general in that
country, but also because such actions face considerable legal hurdles in the form
of establishing standing and causation.2 36
These differences raise important questions for the future regulatory role of
litigation in both jurisdictions. On the one hand, one can argue that the course of
climate change litigation is heavily influenced by the legal culture of the relevant
jurisdiction and that a regulatory model that includes litigation simply needs to
take that culture into account. Under that view, these pathways help show where
litigation has and likely will have the most regulatory influence and the nature of
that influence.
On the other hand, one might claim that litigation may not be so pathdependent. A comparative understanding of these pathways could change the
future course of litigation by assisting cross-jurisdictional learning. For example,
a U.S. NGO might examine whether relevant U.S. law might allow for more
direct adaptation cases in the United States that would facilitate mitigationadaptation linkages and urgent adaptation action. Cases that did not succeed in
their direct goals may also serve as an opportunity for learning as well, even as
they close direct pathways. An Australian NGO might consider (and many are
already actively doing so) mounting a U.S. style tort claim if it thinks it can avoid
some of the pitfalls that befell those cases in the United States. And Australian
233. In Australia, see, for example, Minister for Planning v. Walker (2008) 161 LGERA 423, 454; Byron
Shire Council v. Vaughan; Vaughan v.Byron Shire Council [2009] NSWLEC 88; Parkes v.Byron Shire Council
[2004] NSWLEC 92; Charles Howard Pty Ltd vRedland Shire Council (2007) 159 LGERA 349; Daikyo (North
Queensland) Pty Ltd v Cairns City Council [2003] QPEC 22. In the United States, see, for example, Petition to
the New York Public Service Commission on Natural Hazard Planning, (submitted Dec. 12, 2012).
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major emitters may try to learn from the recent failures of U.S. challenges to
regulations as they consider challenging regulation or enforcement under the new
climate change statute.
Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, an examination of these pathways in
the context of climate change litigation provides a case study of the benefits and
limitations of courts as regulators. The multiplicity of pathways demonstrates the
many ways in which courts can be flexible, deliberative, participatory sites for the
creation of regulation. In both countries, particularly in the statutory mandate and
interpretation contexts, their decisions have led to regulation of climate change
that might not otherwise have existed under those statutes. Moreover, as the many
indirect pathways reveal, litigants use courts in a wide variety of ways to change
the regulatory environment for climate change. The numerous possible pathways
have allowed a wide range of public and private stakeholders to support or
oppose more extensive regulation of GHGs and the impacts of their accumulation
in the atmosphere.
However, this model also reinforces the notion that efforts to use litigation as a
regulatory tool can equally face problems of courts' information deficits, narrow
interpretation of technical rules such as standing or causation, and complex
positionality with respect to policy consequences. Judges themselves often
articulate concerns about information, especially regarding climate science, in
oral argument and opinions. For example, Justice Scalia expressed his hesitation
to engage climate change science in the Massachusettsv. EPA oral argument and
the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in AEP v. Connecticut indicated that agencies
were more capable than courts to undertake the complex scientific assessments
involved with climate change.2 37 The Australian case of Xstrata provides an even
starker example of the potentially problematic practices of lay courts attempting
to understand and apply climate science principles.2 38 In that case, the court
involved questioned the accuracy of well-regarded scientific analyses of climate
change such as those of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, even
going so far as to conduct its own reanalysis of scientific conclusions regarding
temperature increases over the last half century. 239
Skepticism as to the veracity of expert evidence regarding climate change
impacts has also made its way-albeit more subtly-into courts' application of
causation requirements in claims seeking to link particular projects, such as coal
mines or coal-fired power stations, to broader, global climate change. In the

237. See sources cited supra note 25.
238. Re Xstrata Coal Queensland Pty Ltd [2007] QLRT 33 (Unreported, Koppenol P, 15 February 2007).
This decision was subsequently appealed to and overturned by the Queensland Supreme Court: Queensland
ConservationCouncil Inc v Xstrata Coal QueenslandPry Ltd (2007) 158 Local Government and Environmental
Law Reports 322.
239. Re Xstrata Coal Queensland Pty Ltd [2007] QLRT 33 (Unreported, Koppenol P, 15 February 2007) at
paragraphs 16-19.
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Australian case of Wildlife Whitsunday-involving an administrative law challenge to the decision-making process in respect of two new coal mines and the
potential for emissions from the coal harvested to harm iconic ecosystems such as
the Great Barrier Reef-Justice Dowsett of the Federal Court expressed his doubt
as to the connection between impacts upon such ecosystems and "the burning of
coal at some unidentified place in the world, the production of greenhouse gases
from such combustion, its contribution towards global warming, and the impact
of global warming upon a protected matter ....
These pathways make clear the details of courts' efforts to keep appropriate
distance from other branches' policymaking functions while recognizing that
their decisions necessarily have policy consequences. The direct regulatory
approaches in both jurisdictions reveal courts doing this difficult dance in a
manner that causes interactions among the regulatory pathways. When courts
interpret statutes and address mandates under them, they evince an awareness
that these interpretive acts may have lawmaking consequences; this awareness is
clear both in the decisions that impact regulation through how a court interacts
with a statute and when it chooses to "prod and plea." The U.S Supreme Court's
nuanced view of its regulatory role particularly came through in its AEP v.
Connecticut opinion. The Court decided that political question was not a
threshold barrier to a common law public nuisance case, but then deferred
through the doctrine of displacement to functions of the legislative branch and
executive agencies acting under statutory authority. It thus constrained common
law avenues through which courts would act as more direct regulators and
reinforced statutorily-based ones in which it interpreted statutes and executive
branch action under them. 2 4 ' The indirect pathways further reinforce the complex
regulatory position in which these lawsuits put courts. Even when the litigation
does not directly change the regulatory landscape, its moral, economic, and
cultural ripple effects connect judges' choices to policy consequences.
CONCLUSION

This article's survey of the climate change regulatory landscape, and the role
of litigation in the United States and Australia in shaping that landscape,
underlines the fundamental nature of climate change as a complex, multidimensional regulatory problem. For many, the first best response to such a
problem is government regulation-at national and international levels by
executive and legislative branches-established in order to institute coordinated,
strong measures for mitigation and adaptation to climate change. Proactive
climate change litigation has emerged, at least to some extent, as a response to the
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inadequacies of governmental regulatory efforts and is attempting to bridge the
gap that exists between those efforts and the goal of a sustainable, clean energy
future.
However, characterizing litigation as merely gap-filling misses the full spectrum of its regulatory significance. Using a broad understanding of regulation, we
have sought to map the wide variety of ways in which climate change litigation
may generate pathways for proactive action to address climate change, as well as
opposition to that action. Harnessing these pathways effectively will require
skillful use of a range of legal mechanisms and theories drawn from diverse legal
areas, from torts law to constitutional law and corporate law. We hope that this
conceptual mapping will inspire specialists in these fields to consider the
contribution that litigation in their different legal fields may make to overall
climate change regulation and, potentially, to other areas of regulation addressing
complex problems. Our conceptual mapping exercise may also be of use to
international and comparative lawyers in seeking to understand the ways in
which climate change litigation might generate transnational and international
regulatory pathways, in addition to domestic ones.
In this article, we have told the story of climate change litigation as primarily
one of progressive lawyers using a range of different legal tools in an effort to
generate broad-based regulatory change towards realization of a sustainable
energy future. As such cases have begun to achieve some successes, such as the
federal regulatory program stimulated by the Massachusetts v. EPA decision, we
have seen a growing body of anti-regulatory cases emerging in the United States,
which the article also has traced. Given experience in the European Union, we
might also anticipate that implementation of the new Australian carbon pricing
mechanism-will generate its own share of cases testing the "boundaries" of the
legislation.2 42 As climate change litigation moves ahead it will be important to
evaluate the extent to which progressive or anti-regulatory litigation is winning
out in its overall regulatory impact. What is certain, however, is that close and
detailed analysis of the litigation landscape that is emerging will yield important
insights for our understanding of the role of courts and litigants in climate change
policy-making processes and, more broadly, in addressing complex regulatory
problems.

242. Navraj Ghaleigh, "Six honest serving men " supra note 35, at 45.

